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Abstract 
This thesis was conducted in order to investigate two issues: (1) how sensitive 
event related potentials (ERPs), and more specifically the medial frontal negativity and 
the P3 components, are to the valence and magnitude of reward-related stimuli, and (2) 
whether individual differences have an effect on the sensitivity of these ERP components 
to these characteristics. This was investigated using two reward-related paradigms. 
In the "pure gambling task" participants were asked to choose between two cards, 
each containing varying dollar amounts (large or small). The outcome of the choice (i.e., 
win or loss) was revealed after the choice was made. Additionally, participants were 
shown whether the non-chosen card would have been a win or a loss. In the "simple 
response task", participants were presented with five cues (large win, large loss, small 
win, small loss or zero) that labelled the trial as either a potential win, a potential loss or 
no change. Following the cue, a target appeared on the screen and the participant's task 
was to press the response key while the target was still visible. A success led to a win 
(gain in money) or no loss (no change) depending on the cue. Thirty participants 
completed both tasks; afterwards they filled out a set of questionnaires measuring 
personality and other individual differences relating to risk-taking behaviour. 
The results of both tasks showed that ERP components can differentiate between 
the valence and magnitude of reward-related stimuli, although no single component was 
uniquely related to either of the characteristics as previous suggested in the literature. 
Additionally, the context of the stimulus presentation (e.g., the task structure, condition 
within the task) affected the relationships between the ERP components and stimulus 
characteristics. 
The relations among differences across participants in the ERP components and 
personality characteristics were inconsistent and, thus, no firm conclusions could be 
drawn. However, it must be noted that some of the relations were consistent within the 
tasks but not between tasks, suggesting that these are also affected by the context of the 
stimulus, potentially due to the role of individual differences on the psychological set at 
the moment of the stimulus presentation. The implications of these results for 
understanding the cognitive electrophysiology of reward processing are discussed. 
In summary, results of the current thesis suggest that the task structure and goals 
determine the meaning of the stimulus to an individual, leading to specific psychological 
sets. Any relations observed between ERP components, their sensitivity to the stimulus 
and individual differences are moderated by these psychological sets. 
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Electrocortical responses in reward paradigms and their variation 
related to personality 
Rewards provide motivation for both simple and complex behaviours, such as 
seeking food or striving for academic success. Oftentimes the pursuit of the reward 
involves risky behaviour. For example, gambling is associated with the possible risk of 
losing money and smoking is linked to serious health risks. Nevertheless, people engage 
in these activities daily and with considerable differences in their definition of acceptable 
risks. In order to understand what factors contribute to these differences in behaviour we 
must first understand how reward-related behaviour arises. 
There are several processes that are important for risk-taking or reward-related 
behaviour. Once the stimulus is presented, the organism is expected to engage in 
assessment ofthe value ofthe stimulus (i.e., forms a subjective value) based on the 
evaluation of the current needs and the required costs and efforts involve in obtaining the 
reward. Additionally, the individual should assess the risks associated with the attainment 
of the reward. The assessment of the risks involved is also subjective because it depends 
on previous experiences, estimations of probabilities of favourable outcome as well as 
inherent biases that an individual has (e.g., individuals high in harm-avoidance will be 
biased toward avoiding unfavourable outcomes and thus might overestimate the risks). 
Thus, reward-related behaviour depends on a number of factors governed by the neural 
circuitry, and consequently individual differences. 
In the current thesis, reward processes associated with risk-taking behaviour are 
examined using event-related potentials (ERPs) and their relationships with a number of 
individual differences. Identifying ERP components sensitive to various characteristics of 
1 
reward-related stimuli provides a time-sensitive, portable, and relatively inexpensive 
technique for the investigation of the impact of developmental and personality factors on 
each stage of the reward-related behaviour. 
Reward-related neural circuitry 
Reward-related behaviour includes assessment and assignment of a subjective value 
to the reward, and then regulation of behaviour accordingly. The subjective value of a 
reward will depend on the organism's internal state (e.g., if one is hungry, food will have 
a higher reward value than if one is satiated) and the amount of risk associated with 
obtaining the reward. In other words, the subjective value of the reward will affect one's 
motivation and consequently behaviour. This is achieved through recruitment of a 
number of subcortical and cortical structures (Rolls, 2005) mediated by several 
neurotransmitters (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). For simplicity, this review will be 
focused on the neurotransmitter dopamine and a few critical structures that have been 
shown to be most critically involved in reward-related behaviour. 
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter most commonly associated with rewarding 
behaviour and is also well known for its role in movement control and in executive 
cognitive functions (see Schultz, 2007 for a review). Dopaminergic functions are 
determined by the region of activation as wen as the mechanism of its release. Neurons 
originating in the substantia-nigra and projecting to the basal ganglia are responsible for 
movement regulation, while cells in the midbrain (ventral tegmentum) projecting to the 
limbic system and frontal cortex are associated with reward processing (Julien, 2005). 
This latter pathway, referred to as mesolimbocortical, projects to nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc), amygdala, and the prefrontal cortex (PFC). To date a number of studies have 
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demonstrated involvement of these structures in reward-related behaviour (see 
O'Doherty, 2004, for a review). 
The amygdala and NAcc have been shown to be active in response to obtaining a 
reward (Ernst et at, 2005). Another fMRI study showed significant activation ofNAcc to 
both anticipation and acquisition of the reward (Dillon et aI., 2008). However, an 
interesting fmding by Wakabayashi, Fields, and Nicola (2004) suggests that NAcc does 
not playa direct role in the willingness of an animal to wait for a reward. Thus, while 
NAcc might be sensitive to anticipation and consumption of the reward, it is not required 
for reward anticipation once reward-seeking behaviour has been initiated. 
More recently Kable and Glimcher (2007) demonstrated increased activity in the 
medial PFC and ventral striatum in response to increasing subjective values of rewards as 
measured by the delay discounting paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are presented 
with a number of monetary choices, where one can receive a small reward immediately or 
a larger reward after a certain period of time. The sizes of the reward as well as the delay 
periods were varied from trial to trial. Medial PFC has also been shown to be sensitive to 
the objective values of rewards (Potts, Martin, Burton & Montague, 2006). 
Other structures directly involved in processing of rewards are dorsal striatum and 
PFC. Delgado, Locke, Stenger and Fiez (2003) have shown, using a gambling paradigm, 
that dorsal striatum is sensitive to the valence of the stimulus independent of its 
magnitude. However, the results showed that in the 6- to 9-second period after the 
presentation of the feedback, this area was also sensitive to the magnitude of the reward 
with largest rewards eliciting the highest BOLD response and large punishments the 
lowest. As for the PFC, more specifically orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a number of studies 
3 
have implicated this area as one that is sensitive to rewards (see Kringelbach & Rolls, 
2004, for a review). For example, Kheramin and colleagues (2004) conducted an 
experiment in order to determine if rats with lesions to the dopaminergic afferent 
connections with OFC would behave differently from controls when given a choice 
between immediate and delayed rewards. The authors found that the lesioned group was 
less willing to delay gratification (i.e, had steeper slope of the discounting function),but 
were more tolerant of the delay to the large reinforcers (i.e., showed significantly longer 
indifference delays to the large reinforcers when compared to the sham lesioned group).,. 
However, it must be noted that higher tolerance for delays for large rewards does not 
indicate a steeper rate of discounting because the hyperbolic model of delay discounting 
is dependent on both the delay and the sensitivity to the reinforcer. In general, the results 
showed that these connections are important for the processing of both the reward size as 
well as to the delay of the reward. 
Further support for the involvement of dopamine in reward-related behaviour 
comes from a study examining the effects of a dopamine agonist used to treat patients 
with Parkinson's disease (Dodd et at, 2005). The authors showed that higher doses of the 
drug can lead to maladaptive reward seeking behaviour such as gambling or excessive 
eating. They also noted that the more extreme cases of maladaptive behaviour were 
associated with a drug targeting D3 receptors, which are present primarily in the 
phylogenetically older structures of the brain, including the limbic system. This finding 
further implicates the involvement of the mesolimbocortical pathway in reward-related 
behaviour. 
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Thus, the mesolimbocortical pathway is responsive to rewards and their 
anticipation. However, dopaminergic neurons also project to the area responsible for 
regulation of behaviour; namely the OFC, which includes the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC; 
Naqvi, Tranel & Bechara, 2004). As a part of the PFC, the OFC has also been shown to 
be sensitive to rewards among various sensory modalities, subjective measures (e.g., 
preference ranking) as well as abstract rewards (O'Doherty & Dolan, 2006). This 
sensitivity to various types of rewards as well as its connection to areas responsible for 
higher cognitive functions provides OFC with the necessary information to 'decide' on 
the appropriate behaviour. In fact, this area has been implicated in decision making due to 
its role in processing of emotional valences and adapting to changes in reward 
contingencies by inhibiting conflicting, irrelevant or competing behavioural responses 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Katkin, Wiens & Ohman, 2001). People with 
lesions to OFC are characterized by behavioural disinhibition (Spinella & Miley, 2004; 
Chan et at, 2005), impulsivity, and lack of concern with negative consequences (Spinella 
& Miley, 2004). O'Doherty's (2004) review of experimental and lesion data further 
supports the involvement of OFC in behaviour regulation and, consequently, the 
decision-making process. 
In summary, the subjective/motivational values of the reward are determined by the 
internal state of the organism. Further, the ability to code the reward value and adjust 
behaviour accordingly is primarily provided by the mesolimbocortical dopaminergic 
pathway. Thus, the subcortical and cortical areas that playa role in the reward-related 
behaviours are differentially involved during various stages of processing of this 
information. The numerous connections between these areas lead to relatively fast 
5 
changes in the mesocorticolimbic pathway in response to changes at different stages of 
the behaviour. 
ERP components in reward-related tasks 
The rapid time-course of the events described above as well as the differential 
involvement of various cortical areas make ERPs an excellent method for tracking the 
changes in neural responses during the decision-making process. ERP components that 
differentiate between the stages of reward-related behaviour provide markers based on 
activity in the neural pathway and have been frequently used in research as a tool for 
investigation of reward-related processes. Localization techniques that have been 
developed for the ERP data allow researchers to associate activations of specific brain 
areas with the occurrence of any given ERP component. In this section, several studies 
investigating the sensitivity of ERP components to magnitude ~nd valence of the 
stimulus, the most important of which is the feedback-related negativity (FRN) observed 
about 200-300 ms following feedback, are summarized. 
Yeung and Sanfey (2004) showed that feedback of positive and negative valence 
elicits different amplitudes ofFRNs. More specifically, losses on a gambling task were 
shown to elicit more negative (i.e., larger) FRNs than wins. This general result has been 
replicated a number of times since then using similar tasks (Toyomaki & Murohashi, 
2005a; Goyer, Woldorff, & Huettel, 2008; Kamarajan, et at, 2009) and even without 
participants' active involvement (i.e., watched the choices of another; Yeung, Holroyd, & 
Cohen, 2005). Furthermore, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) reported that the P3 amplitude (a 
larger positivity observed 300-500 ms following the stimulus) differentiated between the 
magnitude of the reward but not the valence. However, the studies replicating the FRN 
6 
results have shown that the P3 is sensitive to both magnitude and valence of the feedback 
(Toyomaki & Murohashi, 2005a; Goyer, et aI., 2008; Kamarajan, et aI., 2009). 
Nevertheless, in most of the more recent work, researchers have concentrated on 
the FRN component in a quest to identify the extent to which it is sensitive to feedback 
characteristics as well as it's significance in reward processing. Holroyd and Coles 
(2002) proposed a reinforcement-learning theory that states that the FRN (as a component 
related to error-related negativity) is elicited when there is a mismatch between the 
expected and actual outcomes in a discriminant learning task and serves a signal for 
behavioural adjustments. Furthermore, they also proposed a neural mechanism for this 
action where FRN is a signal that is related to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACe) 
through the mesencephalic dopaminergic system. 
The above theory was met with wide interest and support, which led to a number 
of studies investigating the sensitivity ofFRN to predicted outcomes. For example, the 
FRN was found to be of similar magnitude for 'loss' and 'even' feedback in a gambling 
paradigm (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006). This finding suggests that the FRN 
is sensitive to the distinctions between favourable and unfavourable outcomes rather than 
other specific characteristics of the feedback. Furthermore, a series of experiments has 
consistently shown that negative feedback elicited larger FRN s than positive feedback 
(Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006). The neutral stimuli, once again, elicited FRNs of 
similar, if not greater, amplitude to negative feedback, thus suggesting that these two 
types of stimuli are treated similarly. The authors conclude that FRN categorizes 
feedback into two groups, achieving and failing to achieve the task goal, rather than 
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processing the specific feedback given and thus is modulated by the context of the 
stimulus. 
Another theoretical framework is that the FRN represents a warning of the 
potential for negative outcome rather than the outcome itself. Bellebaum and Daum 
(2008) showed that FRN magnitude of non-rewards and rewards were similar to the 
magnitude of negative prediction errors, such that FRN amplitude was larger for the 
unexpected negative outcomes. These results replicated a previous study, which also 
found that FRN was sensitive to violation of reward predictions (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, 
& Simons, 2007). However, in a recent study using a to-betlnot-to-bet paradigm, the FRN 
was found to be larger for the 'to bet' choices when compared to 'not to bet' as well as 
more negative (i.e., larger) for higher wagers (Yu & Zhou, 2009). It must be noted that 
some studies refer to this negativity as feedback related ERN, others as FRN or medial 
frontal negativity (MFN; e.g., Goyer, et aI., 2008). MFN is a more encompassing term, as 
it can be applied to any negativity occurring over the medial prefrontal are of the scalp. 
In summary, the FRN and the P3 ERP components were found to be sensitive to 
various characteristics of reward-related feedback. While the specific significance of this 
FRN sensitivity and the exact dimension of feedback differentiated are still debated, these 
components have proven useful in identifying participants' responses to feedback in 
general. Furthermore, the neural generators for the FRN have been localized to the ACC 
(Nieuwenhuis, Slagter, von Geusau, Heslenfeld, & Holroyd, 2005), which is 
interconnected with the OFC and other motivational and reward relate areas. 
However, apart from differentiating between the valence and magnitude of 
feedback, individuals may interpret this feedback differently due to a number of other 
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factors commonly referred to as personality or temperament variables. In order to 
understand reward and risk-related behaviour, these differences need to be accounted for 
because the biological bases of personality or temperament overlap with the reward-
related circuitry (Gray, 1970; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Haier, 2004; Schweighofer et 
aI., 2009). Furthermore, personality traits have been shown to be related to various ERP 
components (e.g., Boksem, Tops, Kostermans, & De Cremer, 2008). The next section 
describes the primary personality traits related to reward-related behaviour as well as 
providing examples of integration ofERP components with investigations of the effect of 
personality on processing of information. 
Individual differences in reward-related behaviour 
Personality and other individual differences are often found to modulate ERP 
components (e.g., Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004; Boksem et aI., 2006) and thus need to be 
considered when investigating the sensitivity ofERP components to various properties of 
stimuli. Furthermore, as discussed later in this section, individual differences and 
personality variables have been linked to neurobiological systems, providing additional 
reasons to consideration of these factors in investigation of ERP components. Several 
such differences are discussed below in the context of risk-taking and gambling 
behaviour. 
One of the most influential theories of the neurobiology of personality was 
proposed by Jeffery Gray (see, for example, Gray, 1970). His model ofa behavioural 
inhibition system (BIS) and behavioural approach system (BAS) accounts for behaviour 
through the action of two opposing neural systems. As summarized by Fowles (2006), the 
BIS responds to punishment, non-reward, and novelty by increasing arousal levels. It was 
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originally proposed to involve the septohippocampal system and its projections to the 
frontal lobe. The theory of the septohippocampal system's involvement was based on the 
results of studies with anxiety reducing drugs (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). However, 
more recently, the authors have shown that these drugs have an effect on a number of 
pathways, consequently implying that the BIS is widely distributed over several neural 
pathways. Gray and McNaughton (2000) also indicate that both NAcc and amygdala have 
been implicated in the BIS neural pathways. However, the BIS pathways are thought to 
be regulated by other monoaminergic neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, rather than 
dopamine (Carver & White, 1994). 
In contrast to the BIS, the BAS is responsible for activation of goal-directed or 
reward motivated behaviour (Carver & White, 1994). This system is thought to rely on 
mesolimbocortical dopaminergic projections (Fowles, 2006), which are sensitive to 
rewards. Carver and White (1994) developed the BIS/BAS scale in which BAS is 
measured using three different subscales: reward responsiveness, drive, and fun seeking. 
Individuals high on these scales seem to be relatively more motivated by rewarding 
stimuli. Consequently, these individuals should also be more sensitive to rewards, or 
willing to take higher risks to achieve smaller reward due to a relatively lower sensitivity 
to punishment and thus underestimation ofthe risks than individuals high on BIS. 
Although there are a number of researchers investigating the relationship between 
ERP components and BISIBAS scores, not all of these studies include reward-related 
tasks. For example, Boksem and colleagues (2006) investigated the relationship between 
the error-related negativity (ERN) and positivity (Pe) elicited in a standard flanker task (a 
perceptually based selective attention task) and BISIBAS. The results showed that BIS 
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was related to larger ERN amplitude, whereas BAS was associated with larger Pe 
amplitude. These findings were further supported by significant partial correlations 
between BIS and ERN, controlling for BAS and Pe and vice versa. The authors also 
reported that there were no significant correlations between BAS and ERN or BIS and Pe, 
thus showing double dissociation. These results suggest that BIS and BAS may reflect 
the activation of different neural processes, which then are responsible for producing 
distinct ERP components. 
Recently it was shown that the amount of risk-taking in a gambling paradigm is 
governed more by the concerns for loss, as measured by the BIS sub-scale of the 
questionnaire, and not by the desire to win, measured by the BAS sub-scale (Demaree, 
DeDonno, Burns & Everhart, 2008). The authors of this study also found that sensation 
seeking was related more to the chosen probability of wins rather than the size of the 
wager. Additionally, research has shown that people who score high on sensation seeking 
also show higher activations of posterior medial OFC in response to emotionally arousing 
stimuli (Joseph et aI, 2009). In an unrelated study, individual's level of risk-taking could 
be predicted from pre-task or baseline activations of the right PFC (Gianotti et at, 2009). 
Furthermore, predisposition to the sensation seeking behaviour is associated with higher 
risks of engaging in problem gambling (Johansson et al., 2009). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that high sensation seeking is related to higher activations of PFC, which 
then mediates the processing of the valence of the rewards. 
Whereas predominance of the BAS and sensation seeking seem to predispose the 
organism to risk-taking, predominance ofthe BIS is thought to do the opposite. 
Additionally, BIS is thought to be activated in individuals who also have high levels of 
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harm avoidance (Hansenne et aI., 2003). Harm avoidance has been previously linked to 
ERP components by the same authors, but there has been little research done 
investigating the role of this trait in gambling paradigms, as well as sensitivity to reward 
magnitude and valence. 
Another trait that might be relevant to performance on a risk-taking task as wen as 
to a predisposition to reward-processing is impulsivity. One of the operational definitions 
of impulsivity is the preference of smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed ones or 
the inability to "delay gratification" (Evenden, 1999; Spinella, 2004). It has been 
proposed that individuals internally discount the value of the delayed reward (i.e., the 
longer one waits for the reward, the smaller is its perceived value); the more impulsive 
the person is, the higher is the discounting rate (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004). This 
phenomenon is referred to as delayed discounting and has been demonstrated in a number 
of studies. Among those shown to have significantly higher discounting rates than the 
control populations are children with ADHD (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004), drug users 
(Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Epstein et at, 2003) and smokers (Ohmura, Takahashi, & 
Kitamura, 2005). 
Most delay discounting tasks are concerned with monetary rewards and require one 
to choose between immediate and delayed monetary rewards. These tasks are proposed to 
measure impulsivity shown during decision-making (Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards & 
De Wit, 2006; Lagorio & Madden, 2005). As mentioned previously, OFC is involved in 
the evaluation of rewards as well as inhibition of impulses, which makes it a good 
candidate to be intimately associated with delay discounting. Consistent with this is 
Goldstein and colleagues' (2007) recent finding of a graded activation in the PFC of 
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normal individuals as a response to increasing monetary rewards. However, this pattern 
of activation was not observed in cocaine addicts, the majority of which also rated $lO as 
being equally valuable, subjectively, as $lOOO. Additionally, Bechara, Tranel and 
Damasio (2000) also showed that patients with lesions to the vrnPFC tend to strongly 
discount future consequences of their decisions. 
Another set of individual differences that is relevant to reward-related and, more 
specifically, risk-taking behaviour is the degree of cognitive distortions that individuals 
engage in. The most common ofthese distortions are the illusion of control and gambler's 
fallacy (Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 2002). Illusion of control refers to the 
belief that one's behavior influences the outcomes of a chance-determined event. 
Gamblers' fallacy, on the other hand, is one's belief that future chance outcomes are 
dependent on past chance outcomes. Individuals who hold these cognitive distortions are 
thought to be less cognitively sophisticated about the laws of chance and hence are more 
likely to engage in gambling behaviour (Johansson, et al., 2009). Both of these variables 
have been identified as risk factors for problem gambling (Johansson, et al., 2009) and 
thus are good candidates for individual differences that affect reward-related processing. 
Furthermore, pathological gamblers also show higher levels of obsessive 
compulsive traits but not obsessive-compulsive disorder (Durdle, Gorey, & Stewart, 
2008; Johansson et al., 2009), thus suggesting that this trait also has a role in reward 
related processing. However, there has been no research done investigating the impact of 
obsessive compulsive traits on ERP components in gambling or risk-taking paradigms. 
Similarly, Brand and AltstOtter-Gleich (2008) have found that performance on the Iowa 
Gambling Task was related to certain characteristics of perfectionism (concern over 
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mistakes and personal standards) but not related to perfectionism as a whole. The authors 
concluded that this trait can playa role in decision making but does not influence 
decisions made when the outcomes are uncertain. Similar to the literature on problem 
gambling and obsessive compulsiveness, the presence of these traits is related to risk-
taking behaviour to some degree. Furthermore, Bagby and colleagues (2007) found that 
problem gamblers scored higher on neuroticism and lower on conscientiousness when 
compared to non-problem gamblers. This suggests that a number of individual 
differences and personality variables playa role in determining behaviour in risk-
taking/reward-related situations but more research is needed to further clarify the 
relationships among these factors and ERP components, especially in the context of a 
risk-taking paradigms. 
In summary, personality characteristics have been implicated in the processing of 
reward and risk-related information. However, there is still very little research exploring 
the relationships among the personality traits related to reward processing and the ERP 
components. Whereas some authors suggest that personality characteristics induce 
automatic biases in processing of information (e.g., Hansenne et aI., 2003) or ,conversely, 
automatic biases in the processing of information might underlie the development of 
various personality characteristics, little work has been done to investigate the 
relationships between the ERP components and these characteristics in a task that would 
maximize the effect of these variables by utilizing relevant situations. Examining the 
relationships among the ERPs and these individual differences in a risk-taking or reward-
related paradigm will allow for interpretation of the relationships in context of task goals 
and individual's decisionslbehaviour providing a more comprehensive picture of the 
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associations. In other words,varying the nature of the gambling task will provide a range 
of contexts in which to examine the ERP components and individual differences as wen 
as the relationships among them. 
Goals for this thesis 
In this thesis two tasks, adapted from previous literature (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004; 
Bjork et aI., 2004) were used in order to explore the sensitivity ofERP components to 
various characteristics of the stimulus and its context as well as relationships between 
these components and individual differences. More specifically, the ERP components' 
sensitivity to the valence and the magnitude of the stimulus in the context of feedback 
and potential reward/punishment were examined. Apart from investigating the effects of 
reward related individual differences discussed above (e.g., BISIBAS, harm avoidance, 
cognitive distortions), the following studies also included a measure of sensitivity to 
reward and punishment, as these two scales are often thought to be related to the 
BIS/BAS measure [although a more recent study suggests that this relationship might not 
be as strong as previously suggested (Cogswell, Alloy, van Dulmen, & Fresc02006)]. 
It was expected that ERP components would differentiate between magnitude and 
valence of the stimuli. More specifically, the FRN component was expected to 
differentiate between wins and losses and the P3 component between large and small 
wagers, replicating Yeung and Sanfey's (2004) findings. Additionally, given the 
exploratory nature of the effect of individual differences on the ERP components, our 
hypothesis are tentative. Participants scoring high on behavioural inhibition (high BIS 
scores), harm avoidance and sensitivity to punishment were expected to react more 
strongly to losses and make fewer high-risk choices. Thus, it was hypothesized that these 
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participants would have a stronger response to losses, which would be indicated by a 
larger FRN amplitude. Those with high BAS scores who also would score high on 
sensation seeking and sensitivity to reward were hypothesised to engage in riskier 
behaviour and have a relationship with ERP components complementary to the previous 
group of variables, i.e., to react more strongly to wins and to make more high-risk 
choices. Taking into consideration Yeung and Sanfey's (2004) findings, it is expected 
that these participants will show a smaller FRN in response to wins when compared to 
those scoring low on these measures. Furthermore, those sensitive to reward and high 
scores on BAS scale were also expected to differentiate more between rewards of various 
magnitude (large vs. small), as would be shown by a larger difference in P3 amplitude 
between the conditions. 
Furthermore, higher levels of cognitive distortion and delay discounting scores 
were expected to be associated with riskier choices. Individuals high on cognitive 
distortions were also expected to have weaker reactions to losses (i.e., smaller FRNs). 
Measures of conscientiousness, neuroticism, perfectionism and obsessive compulsiveness 
traits were also included in the analysis as these characteristics were found to be potential 
risk or protective factors in pathological gambling. The relationships between ERP 
components as well as behavioural measures on the reward-related tasks were examined, 
but this investigation is exploratory and no specific hypotheses were made. 
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Study 1: Pure Gambling Task 
As described earlier, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) investigated the sensitivity ofERP 
components to the magnitude and valence of rewarding stimuli. In their task, participants 
were asked to make a choice between two colour coded cards. Two of the four colours 
indicated large wager amounts and two were associated with small amounts. Participants 
were informed that either card could be a win or a loss and the results of their choice as 
well as the actual magnitude of the card would be revealed after the choice was made. 
Following the feedback on the chosen card, participants were also shown the alternative 
card. In examining the ERP components elicited by the feedback on the chosen card, 
Yeung and Sanfey (2004) found that the FRN component was sensitive to the valence of 
the feedback, such that FRNs to losses were more negative than to wins, but not to the 
magnitude of the chosen card. In contrast, the P3 component was sensitive only to the 
magnitude of the card, with smaller amounts eliciting a smaller P3 amplitude, but not to 
the valence of the feedback (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Thus, the authors concluded that 
valence and magnitude of reward-related feedback is coded independently in the brain 
and can be differentiated by specific ERP components. 
Apart from investigating the ERP components to the chosen card, the authors also 
looked at the brain responses elicited by the alternative card. The ERPs did not dissociate 
magnitude and valence of the alternative card as clearly as in the case of chosen card: the 
P3 was sensitive to both magnitude and valence of the alternative, where as the FRN did 
not differentiate either. Following this, the alternative cards were grouped into two 
conditions: alternative worse than the outcome and alternative better than the outcome. 
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Once again, the FRN did not differentiate between the two conditions, whereas the P3 
was larger when the alternative was better than the chosen card. 
A modified version of the Yeung and Sanfey's (2004) task was used to further 
investigate the sensitivity of each component to reward magnitude and valence. Based on 
Yeung and Sanfey (2004), it was expected that the FRN component will be sensitive to 
the valence of the feedback and the P3 to the magnitude of the chosen card. Unlike the 
original task, the participants were shown the amount that could be won or lost prior to 
making a choice. This was done in order to ensure that the P3 component is sensitive to 
the magnitude of the stimulus in the context of the feedback. Furthermore, personality 
traits associated with reward-related behaviour (e.g., sensitivity to reward, harm 
avoidance) were measured so that they could be related to each ERP component. 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-one Brock University students (Mage = 22, SD = 2.82; 18 females) 
participated in this study during spring and fan semesters. All of the participants reported 
having no neurological conditions (e.g., epilepsy) or psychiatric difficulties (e.g., 
depression) that could affect the recordings and reported having normal or corrected to 
normal vision. The majority of the sample was currently completing an undergraduate 
degree (N = 23) and the rest was either in graduate school (N = 4) or were beginning 
employment (N = 4). Two people identified themselves as smokers. Nearly half of the 
sample did not gamble at all (N = 14) and, of those who did, seven spend between $3 and 
$5 a month on gambling and another 10 spend anywhere from $10 to $80. Overall, of 
those who reported engaging in gambling activities, 15% (SD = 26.4), with a minimum of 
0.75% and maximum of 100% of total spending income was used for gambling. 
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Materials 
The Task 
The pure gambling task used in this study was adapted from Yeung and Sanfey's 
work in 2004 (see Figure 2.1). Participants were first presented with two cards, each 
showing the amount for a potential win or loss. The cards stayed on the screen until the 
participant made a choice and there were three possible combinations: cards with values 
that were both high, both low, or with one high and one low. The large amounts ranged 
from $1.95 to $2.05, while the small amounts were between $0.45 and $0.55. Once the 
choice was made, the chosen card was highlighted by a yellow border for 500 ms 
following which a plus or a minus sign, signifying a win or a loss respectively, appeared 
next to the amount. After an additional 1000 ms the card that was not chosen was 
highlighted by a blue border for 750 ms, after which a plus or a minus sign appeared next 
to the amount and stayed on the screen for 1000 ms. The win to loss ratio in the task was 
set to be 60:40. There was an equal number ofwinlwin (i.e., chosen card was a win and 
the alternative outcome was also a win) and win/loss trials as well as an equal number of 
loss/win and loss/loss trials. There were 64 trials in each block, with an intertrial interval 
of 1000 ms, and 5 blocks in the entire task. At the end of each block the running total was 
shown and the participants could take a break of any desired length. At the end of the task 
participants were given the amount they won (M = $8.29, SD = 12.98, minimum = -
14.60, maximum = 28.52); however, it must be noted that the running total could go 
below zero and some participants failed to win anything on this task. 
Individual Differences Questionnaires 
Handedness Questionnaire. This measure was adapted from Oldfeild (1971) and 
assesses the degree of right/left handedness by asking participants to answer 10 questions 
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about hand preference in various situations, e.g., Which hand is used to draw? 
Participants are asked to answer on a 6-point scale ranging from I (always left) to 6 
(always right) to be recorded for demographic reasons (Appendix A). 
BISIBAS. Behaviour Inhibition and Behavioural Activation Scale were assessed 
using Carver and White's (1994) BIS/BAS questionnaire. It consists of20 items such as 
'I crave excitement and new sensations.' and participants will be asked to rate how 
accurately each item describes them on a scale ranging from 0 (very accurate) to 4 (very 
inaccurate; Appendix A). 
Harm avoidance. This trait was measured using the harm-avoidance scale of the 
Temperament and Character inventory (Cloninger, Przybeck, Svrakic, & Wetzel, 1994). 
This questionnaire consists of 10 statements like 'I seek danger' and 'I know no limits'. 
The participants are asked to judge how wen each statement describes them on a 5-point 
Likert scale, ranging from very inaccurate (1) to very accurate (5; Appendix A). 
Sensitivity to rewardlpunishment. In the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity 
to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ; Torrubia, Avila, Molto, & Caseras, 2001), participants 
are asked to read 47 questions (e.g., Do you often refrain from doing something because 
you are afraid of it being illegal?) and decide which of the 4 choices most accurately 
describe them. The choices range from YY (very much yes) to NN (very much no; 
Appendix A). 
Sensation seeking. This trait is assessed using Zuckerman's Sensation Seeking 
Scale (Zyckerman, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978). The scale consists of 40 items (e.g., I 
prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable) and participants were asked how much 
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the agree or disagree with each statement on a four point scale with choice ranging from 
TT (very much true) to FF (very much false; Appendix A). 
Perfectionism. The AB5C perfectionism scale (Hofstee, de Raad & Goldberg, 
1992) consists of nine items and asks participants to rate the degree to which they agree 
with the statement on a 5 point Likert scale. The scale includes items such as 'I continue 
until everything is perfect' and 'I want everything to be "just right''' (Appendix A). 
Neuroticism. The Neuroticism scale from the Abridged Big Five-dimensional 
Circumplex model (AB5C; Hofstee, de Raad & Goldberg, 1992) consists of20 items (10 
reversed keyed) and was obtained from the IPIP database. Participants are asked to rate 
on a 5 point Likert scale to what extend each of the statements (e.g., Often feel blue) 
describe them (Appendix A). 
Conscientiousness. Similar to the neuroticism and perfectionism assessment the 
AB5C (Hofstee, de Raad & Goldberg, 1992), the conscientiousness scale consists of 20 
items (e.g., Pay attention to detail) and asks participants to rate on a 5-point Likert scale 
how accurate each statement is in relation to their personality (Appendix A). 
Obsessive-compulsive traits. The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-
R; Foa, et aI., 2002) inventory consists of 18 items (e.g., 1 check things more often than 
necessary) followed by a 5-point scale on which participants indicate how distressed or 
bothered they were during the past month; Appendix A). 
Gamblers' Beliefs Questionnaire. This scale is a self-report measure of gamblers' 
cognitive distortions (Steenbergh et aI., 2002). The measure consists of two related 
factors: LucklPerseverance and Illusion of Control. Participants are asked to rate on a 7-
point Likert scale, where I corresponds to strongly agree and 7 to strongly disagree, the 
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extent to which they agree with given statements (e.g., I have a "lucky" technique that I 
use when I gamble). The questionnaire was adjusted in order to be applicable to 
participants without prior gambling experience (Appendix A). 
Delay discounting. This measure was developed by Kirby and colleagues (1999) 
and asks participants to circle one of two choices pertaining to the amount of money they 
would prefer from the options given (e.g., $25 today or $30 in 80 days?). In total the task 
has 27 questions. Based on the responses, the researcher can estimate the delay 
discounting rate for each of the participants, measuring the degree of impulsivity 
(Appendix A). 
Procedure 
After signing the consent form (Appendix B) and filling out the handedness 
questionnaire, participants were shown to the electroencephalogram (EEG) equipment 
and fitted with a l28-channel Hydrocel Geodesic Sensor (Electrical Geodesic, Inc., 
Eugene, Oregon) net. Participants were then asked to complete two tasks: a simple 
response task (see Study 2 for details) and the pure gambling task. Once the tasks were 
completed, participants were presented with 10 questions (see Appendix C) on the 
computer screen about their level of happiness or disappointment in each of the 
conditions ( e.g., win/lose). Following the questions, the Sensor net was taken off and 
participants were given time to wash and dry their hair as well as take a break. When they 
were comfortable, participants were given a questionnaire package to complete at their 
own pace. Finally, the payment and the debriefing form (Appendix D) were given and the 
purpose of the study was explained. 
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EEG recording and analyses 
EEG was recorded with 128 channels referenced to the vertex (Cz) using 
NetStation (Version 10.3). The signal was amplified by Net Amps 200 with a band pass 
filter of 0.01 to 100 Hz. The sampling rate was 500 points per second and the impedances 
were maintained below 50 kg. Once the recoding was completed it was exported from 
NetStation to Brain Vision Analyzer (Version 1.05) for further analyses. 
Data from the bad channels (labelled as such after visual inspection ofthe raw data) were 
interpolated\ the data were re-referenced to a common average and filtered using a low 
pass filter of30 Hz and high-pass filter of I Hz. Following this, segmentation was done. 
Feedback trials were segmented as a function of the chosen magnitude (large/small) and 
sign (plus/minus indicating win/loss). Each epoch ranged from 200 ms prior to the onset 
of the stimulus (used to calculate baseline) to 1000 ms after the stimulus. Analyses of the 
alternative card used the same length epoch and the segments were divided based on the 
comparison with the chosen card: win-joy if the chosen card was a win and the alternative 
card was worse (i.e., the chosen card had a better outcome than the alternative), or 10ss-
regret if the chosen card was a loss and the alternative card would have been a better 
choice. 
After segmentation of the data, ocular corrections were performed using the 
procedure of Gratton, Coles and Donchin (1983). Additionally, artifact corrections were 
done automatically, such that the amplitude was kept between -100 !l V and 100 !lV, and 
the maximal absolute difference of two values in the segment allowed was 150 !lV. The 
averaged segments were scored for three components using ERPScore (Segalowitz, 
1 Note: On average two to four channels were interpolated per person, with maximum of six for one of the 
participants. 
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1999): P2 (positivity between 150 and 250 ms), feedback-related negativity (FRN; 200-
350 ms) and P3 (300-500ms). Only the midline channels were scored (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz). 
The amplitude, measured as base-to-peak (baseline was calculate using the data 200 ms 
prior to the onset of stimulus), and latencies for each condition and component were 
analyzed in SPSS 16.0. Within-subject ANOVAs were conducted in order to investigate 
the effect of magnitude and valence on the event-related potentials (ERPs). Additionally, 
correlations were carried out to examine the relationships between ERP components for 
various conditions and personality traits. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis of ERP components revealed that two of the participants 
were outliers (+3SD) on most of the ERP amplitude variables and thus their data were 
removed from further analysis. Without the outliers the distributions for an the 
components did not depart from normality (as tested by the Shapiro-Wilk test) and the 
skewness and kurtosis values were within the acceptable range (±1). Sensitivity to 
punishment scores were not normally distributed so the examination of all the 
relationships between this variable and ERP components used Kandell's tau coefficients. 
Furthermore, participants 14 and 20 were responsible for the relationships produced with 
the delay discounting and BAS scales, respectively, and therefore were also removed 
when examining relationships between ERP components and these variables. It must be 
noted that these participants were outliers (i.e., ±3 SD) on one ofthe scales (participant 
14 on the delay discoUnting and participant 20 on the BAS), but not on any other 
variables. 
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Validity Checks 
The task. The self-report of happiness for winning or disappointment for losing 
each amount was examined using repeated measures t-tests. Results showed that 
participants were more disappointed when they lost a large amount in comparison to 
losing a smaller amount, t (29) = l4.27,p < .001. Similarly, their self-reported level of 
happiness was higher in response to winning a large versus a small amount, t (29) = 
1O.02,p < .001. These results suggested that participants were engaging in the task as 
expected; reporting higher levels of disappointment when losing large amounts and 
higher levels of happiness when winning large amounts. Furthermore, participants 
reported no significant difference in the amount of happiness and disappointment when 
the alternative was, respectively, worse or better than the outcome, t (29) = 0.52,p = 
.611. 
Furthermore, relationships between number of low and high choices on the 
high/low trials with personality measures were examined. There were no significant 
correlations with the majority of personality variables; however, the frequency of self-
reported gambling behaviour was significantly negatively related to the number of low 
and positively to the number of high cards chosen. Participants who reported engaging in 
gambling behaviour (i.e., excluding those who did not) chose high value cards more 
often, r = .53,p = .030. 
Individual Differences. Prior to investigating the relationships between ERP 
components and individual differences, several correlations were done to examine the 
relationships between the personality variables. More specifically, correlations were done 
to examine if BAS, sensation seeking and sensitivity to reward were measuring similar 
types of variance. There was significant positive relationships between BAS and 
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sensitivity to reward, r = .47,p =.013, but not with sensation seeking, r = .35,p =.071; 
however, the latter was in the expected direction (i.e., positive). Sensitivity to reward was 
also positively correlated with sensation seeking, r = .41,p =.039. The relationships 
between BIS, harm avoidance and sensitivity to punishment were examined similarly. 
Scores obtained on the BIS were positively correlated with those of harm avoidance, r = 
.41,p = .023, and sensitivity to punishment, r = .51,p = .003. However, sensitivity to 
punishment and harm avoidance were not significantly correlated, r = .29, p =.108. 
Behavioural Data 
The summary behavioural data is shown in Table 2.1. Participants took longer to 
choose a low value card on the high/low trials than on the low/low trials, t (31) = 4.13,p 
<.001; however, choosing the high value card on high/low trials took as long as making a 
response on the high/high trials, t(31) = 0.31,p =.757. There was a significant difference 
in response times (RT) when choosing on high/high versus low/low trials, t (31) = 3.89,p 
<.001, such that it took longer for participants to choose the high card, but there was no 
difference in RT when choosing high or low card on the high/low trial, t (31) = 0.52, p = 
.608. In summary, choosing a high card took significantly longer compared to choosing a 
low card only when participants did not have any other option (i.e., comparing high/high 
trials to low/low trials). Choosing a low card, on the other hand, took longer in the 
high/low trials when compared to no other option trial (i.e., low/low). For graphical 
representation of these data see Figure 2.2. 
ERPData 
Feedback on the chosen card Prior to statistically examining the relationships 
between various trials and ERP components the stimulus-locked overlay of waveforms 
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for this condition (Figure 2.3) was examined. A clear separation between win and loss 
trials started at the P2 component and continued to be present for the FRN was observed. 
Additionally, the low value wins for the FRN component seemed to be attenuated 
compared to those for the high value wins. The magnitude and valence did not appear to 
be associated with specific ERP components, as previously expected. The FRN appears 
to differentiate the valence of the feedback at specific sites as well as differentiate 
between the magnitudes of the wager on the win trials. The P3 component seemed to be 
differentiating between wins and losses at Fz, but between the feedback for large and 
small wagers at the more posterior channels. In order to examine these patterns 
quantitatively a 2 (valence) x 2 (magnitude) x 4 (site) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted2• 
The ANOVA for the FRN amplitude showed a main effect of magnitude, F (1,28) 
= 27.86,p < .001,P112 = .50, valence, F (1,28) = 9.08,p = .005,P112 = .25, and site, F 
(3,84) = 29.38,p < .001,P112 = .42, e = 0.45, as well as magnitude by site interaction, F 
(3,84) = 4.56,p = .016,pr/ = .14, e = .73. Additionally, there was a marginally significant 
magnitude by valence interaction, F (1,28) = 3.76,p = .063,P112 = .12 (see Table 2.2 for 
means and SDs). The 2 (valence) x 2 (magnitude) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted for each site in order to further investigate the observed effects. There was a 
significant main effect of valence such that FRN s for losses were consistently more 
negative that wins (see Figure 2.4 for the topographical map of the difference in FRN 
amplitude between the conditions). The main effect of magnitude was observed only at 
FCz, Cz and PCz, with feedback for small wagers eliciting larger FRNs than those 
2 Note. If the assumptions of sphericity were violated original degrees of freedom, Greenhouse-Geisser 
epsilon (s) and the corrected p-value are reported. 
27 
observed after large wagers (Table 2.3). However, there was an interaction between 
valence and magnitude of the feedback at FCz, whereby the magnitude of the feedback 
was differentiated only during winning trials (i.e., low value wins produced larger FRN 
than high wins, F (1,28) = 5.59,p = .025, but there was no significant difference between 
wagers during loss trials, F (1,28) = O.4I,p = .529). Thus, in this study FRN was found to 
be statistically sensitive to both magnitude and valence of feedback. While losses and 
feedback for large wagers produced the largest FRN amplitude, the effect of magnitude at 
more anterior channels was observed only on the win trials. 
Similar to the FRN results the 2 x 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOV A for the P3 
amplitude showed a main effect of magnitude, F (1,28) = 95.77,p = .023,pr/ = .17, 
valence, F (1,28) = 25.64,p < .001,P112 = .48 and site, F (1,28) = 44.38,p < .001,pr/ = 
.61, c = .54. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between magnitude and site, 
F (1,28) = 9.84,p < .001,P1l2 = .26, c = .56, as well as valence and site, F (1,28) = 8.29,p 
= .001,P1l2 = .23, c = .50. Averages and standard deviations for the P3 amplitude at each 
site can be seen in Table 2.4. These relationships were further investigated by conducting 
2 (valence) x 2 (magnitude) repeated measures ANOVA for each site (Table 2.5). As 
expected from the examination of the overlay the P3 component was sensitive to the 
valence of the feedback, but only at more anterior sites (i.e., Fz and FCz), such that losses 
elicited larger P3 amplitude (see Figure 2.4). The topographical maps showed that losses 
elicited more anterior P3, whereas the activation observed after wins was slightly more 
posterior (Figure 2.5). The main effect of magnitude was observed at FCz, Cz and CPz, 
with feedback for larger wagers eliciting a larger P3 amplitude (see Figure 2.6 for 
topographical representations). Thus, contrary to the expectations, the P3 component was 
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sensitive to both the valence and the magnitude of the feedback, depending on the site 
examined. 
In summary, both the FRN and the P3 components were shown to differentiate 
between the valence of the feedback as well as the magnitude of the wager; however, 
these effects were dependent on the site examined. The progression of sensitivity of the 
P3 component across sites, from magnitude at more posterior sites to valence at more 
anterior ones, suggests that different dipoles might be responsible for this differentiation, 
with the intermediate channel (Fez) measuring the overlapping signals. 
Alternative outcome. Prior to statistical examination of the data, the stimulus-
locked grand average ofERP components were visually examined in two overlays: 
Figure 2.7 shows alternative feedback of the four basic types (large/small loss and 
large/small win), and Figure 2.8 shows win-joy (alternative worse than outcome after win 
feedback) and loss-regret (alternative better than outcome on loss conditions). As can be 
seen in Figure 2.7, the ERPs four basic conditions were clearly separating at midline 
channels, with the exception of Fz. The FRN was separated on the basis of large versus 
small value alternative cards, without taking into account the valence of the card. The P3 
component, on the other hand, distinguished between all four types of cards, with large 
loss cards eliciting the largest P3 amplitude and small win cards the smallest, as expected 
from previous literature. In figure 2.8, the overlay of joy versus regret showed a larger 
general positivity starting at the P2 component and continuing to P3 for the regret 
condition. 
In order to statistically test the relationships for the FRN observed in the overlay, 
and due to great variations in the FRN size and amplitude (relative to baseline) between 
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the channels four 2 (valence) x 2 (magnitude) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted, one for each of the channels (Table 2.6; see Table 2.7 for the means and SDs). 
There were main effects of magnitude at FCz, Cz, and CPz, such that high value cards 
produced smaller FRN amplitude. There were no other main effects or interaction at any 
of the channels. Thus, the FRN was found to be sensitive to the magnitude of the 
alternative card but not its valence. 
Similar analysis was done to examine the sensitivity of the P3 component to 
magnitude and valence of the alternative cards (see Table 2.8 for means and SDs). The P3 
was found to differentiate between valence and magnitude of the alternative card (Table 
2.9). However the 2 (valence) x 2 (magnitude) repeated measures ANOVAs also showed 
significant interactions at the majority of the midline channels (see Table 2.9). This effect 
was stronger at the more posterior channels (FCz, Cz, and CPz). Graphical representation 
of the data (Figure 2.7) showed larger differentiations between high and low cards when 
the card was also labelled as a win. This was supported by follow-up repeated measures 
ANOV A conducted comparing high and low cards for wins and losses at FCz, Cz, and 
PCz (Table 2. 10), showing that the effect of magnitude was stronger for the winning 
cards. Thus, P3 amplitude can be used to differentiate between magnitude and valence of 
the alternative card, with the largest amplitude for large wins. 
Individual Differences 
The scatter plots for the significant relationships between ERP components and 
measures of individual differences can be seen in Figures 2.9 through 2.37. 
Feedback on the chosen card The relationship between personality variables and 
ERP components were examined at limited sites to reduce Type I error. Cz was chosen 
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for the FRN component due to its sensitivity to both magnitude of the wager and valence 
of the feedback, as well as its consistent use in previous literature (e.g., Boksem et aI., 
2006; Table 2.11). Cz was also chosen for examination of role of individual differences 
on the P3 amplitude for similar reasons. However, the relationships between P3 
amplitude and personality were also examined at Fz due to the unique effects of valence 
observed at this channel. The results of the P3 analysis can be seen in Tables 2.12 and 
2.13. 
Contrary to expectations there were no significant relationships between BIS, 
harm avoidance and sensitivity to punishment with FRN amplitude (see Table 2.11). All 
of the participants showed larger FRNs for losses; additionally, there was a significant 
negative correlation between sensation seeking and FRN amplitude for low loss trials, r = 
-.43, p = .027 (Figure 2.9), such that participants scoring high on the SS scale showed 
larger FRN s when receiving loss feedback for low wagers compared to those scoring low 
on SS. These participants also showed larger P3 amplitude at Fz during the small loss 
condition, r = .47,p = .015 (figure 2.10). Thus, it seems that people who are prone to 
sensation seeking also respond with greater intensity to loss feedback after a low wager. 
Furthermore, participants scoring high on the neuroticism scale showed larger 
FRNs in response to win feedback on small wagers, r = -.39,p = .038 (Figure 2.11). 
These participants also showed smaller P3 amplitude to win feedback for both small, r = -
.43, p = .022 (Figure 2.12), and large, r = -.38, p = .047 (Figure 2.13), wagers as well as 
to large losses, r = -.38,p = .047 (Figure 2.14). There were no other significant 
correlations between simple conditions (i.e., SmalllLarge Loss and Small/Large Win) and 
personality variables. 
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In order to further investigate the relationships among the personality variables 
and the amplitude of ERP components, the difference in amplitude between win and loss 
as well as high and low conditions were examined. To obtain the difference scores for the 
valence of the feedback, several variables were computed. First, to obtain a score for loss 
condition the amplitude for feedback on large and small wagers was averaged. This was 
done for each component at each channel. Secondly, scores for win conditions were 
obtained in similar manner: by averaging amplitude of a specific component obtained in 
response to feedback for large and small wagers. Finally, the loss scores were regressed 
out of the win scores, and the unstandarized residuals were used as the difference residual 
scores between win and loss conditions. A similar procedure was used in order to obtain 
difference residual scores between large and small wagers. 
There was a significant correlation between the BIS scores and the residual scores 
for the FRN amplitude between large and small wagers, r = -.39,p = .045 (Figure 2.15). 
More specifically, participants high on BIS differentiated less between feedback for the 
large and small wagers. The opposite trend was observed for participants reporting more 
obsessive compulsive characteristics, r = .40, p = .042 (Figure 2.16), where a larger 
number of self-reported obsessive compulsive behaviours was associated with larger 
residual scores between feedback to large and small wagers for FRN amplitude. 
Furthermore, participants highly sensitive to reward showed larger residual scores for the 
FRN between win and loss feedback, r = .39,p = .047 (Figure 2.17). 
Similar examination of differences in P3 amplitude at Fz revealed no significant 
correlations with any of the personality variables. However, participants scoring high on 
cognitive distortions had smaller residual scores between win and loss feedback as 
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indicated by P3 amplitude at Cz, r = -.392, P = .039 (Figure 2.18). A similar trend was 
observed with participants reporting more obsessive compulsive characteristics, r = -.429, 
p = .023 (Figure 2.19). The opposite trend was seen in participants scoring high on the 
perfectionism scale, r = .375, p = .045 (Figure 2.20): reporting more perfectionism traits 
was associated with larger residuals between wins and losses at P3. Additionally, the 
percentage of spending money used for gambling was correlated with the ERP 
components. There was a significant correlation between this measure of real-life 
gambling and the P3 amplitude at Fz elicited by large wins, r = .44, p = .025 (Figure 
2.21), such that larger P3 s were observed in participants who spend more money 
gambling. These participants also differentiated more between wins and losses at Fz (P3), 
r = .40,p = .042 (Figure 2.22). However, it must be noted, and can be seen in the 
scatterplots, that both of relationships were driven by several people who gambled the 
most. 
Alternative card feedback. The role of individual differences in processing of the 
magnitude and valence of the alternative card was examined at Cz for both the FRN and 
P3 amplitude (Table 2.14 and 2.15, respectively). Correlations were run for each ofthe 
four types of cards (i.e., large/small loss and large/small win) as well as for the 
combination of card based on the feedback received on the chosen card (i.e., lose regret 
and win joy). 
The amplitude of FRN component at Cz correlated negatively with neuroticism 
when the alternative card was a large loss, r = -.37,p = .050 (Figure 2.23), or a small win, 
r = -.44, p = .018 (Figure 2.24). Participants scoring high on neuroticism showed larger 
FRN to the lose valence oflarge alternative card and win valence for small cards. On the 
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other hand, those scoring high on the conscientiousness scale showed smaller FRN 
amplitude in response to low loss alternative cards, r = .39,p = .043 (Figure 2.25). 
Smaller FRN amplitude was also associated with a higher score on cognitive distortions 
if the alternative cards were revealed to be a low value wins, r = .39,p = .040 (Figure 
2.26). These relationships were not observed for the P3 component, but there were 
significant positive relationships between scores on the obsessive compulsive 
characteristics scale and P3 amplitude for the winning cards of any magnitude. More 
specifically, reports of more obsessive compulsive characteristics were associated with 
larger P3 amplitude when the alternative card was revealed to be a win of either large, r = 
.47,p = 012 (Figure 2.27), or small, r = .52,p = .004 (Figure 2.28), value. 
More conscientious participants showed a smaller FRN amplitude when the 
alternative card was a worse choice when compared to the chosen win card, r = .39,p= 
.043 (Figure 2.29). At the same time participants reporting more obsessive compulsive 
characteristics showed larger P3 amplitude to both win-joy, r = .38, p = .049 (Figure 
2.30), and loss-regret conditions, r = .44, p = .019 (Figure 2.31). Thus, these participants 
appeared to attend more to the revelation of the alternative card, regardless of the 
outcome. 
To clarify the above-mentioned relationships further, a number of correlations 
were conducted between personality measures and residual scores for the amplitude of 
ERP components in various conditions. The residual scores were calculated similarly to 
the feedback difference scores: regressing the amplitude of a specific component in one 
condition out of another and saving the residual. In order to compare the role of 
personality variables in the processing of the alternative card to the chosen card, several 
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residual scores were obtained: win versus loss, high versus low value, joy versus regret. 
Correlation coefficients obtained for the FRN and P3 components can be seen in Tables 
2.16 and 2.17 , respectively. 
The results of the above analyses revealed that participants high on 
conscientiousness were also differentiating less between winning and losing alternative 
cards at the FRN amplitude, r = -.40, p = .042 (Figure 2.32). A similar relationship was 
observed between the residual scores for the P3 amplitude for winning and losing 
alternative cards and scores on obsessive compulsive scale, r = .54, P =.003 (Figure 
2.33): reporting more obsessive compulsive characteristics was associated with smaller 
residual scores between two conditions. Similar to the results for the chosen card, those 
reporting higher levels of cognitive distortions also differentiated less between winning 
and losing cards as reflected in the residual scores of the P3 amplitude, r = .43,p = .022 
(Figure 2.34). Participants that reported being sensitive to rewards showed larger 
differentiation between joy and regret conditions (i.e., between the alternative card being 
worse or better than the chosen one) as indicated by the larger residual scores of P3 
amplitude, r = .43,p =.027 (Figure 2.35). 
Relationships between a measure of real-life gambling and ERP components 
elicited by the feedback and alternative card were also investigated through correlations 
(Tables 2.18 and 2.19, respectively). Once again, these were driven by the several people 
that gambled the most. Spending more money gambling was associated with smaller P3 
amplitude to large loss alternative cards, r = -.48,p < .013 (Figure 2.36) and showed 
larger FRNs to lose regret condi~ons, r = -.42,p < .031 (Figure 2.37). 
Summary 
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Overall, the relationships between personality variables and ERP components for 
reward-related stimuli were found to be inconsistent and not as clear as expected; 
however, some trends could be observed. For example, participants reporting more 
cognitive distortions were found to distinguish less between win and loss feedback on the 
chosen card but showed larger differentiation with respect to the valence of the 
alternative card. Higher reports of obsessive compulsive characteristics were associated 
with smaller residual score for the magnitude of the chosen card. These participants also 
differentiated more between the valence of alternative card (i.e., winning cards vs. losing 
cards) and if choosing the alternative card would have been a better or worse decision 
(i.e., win joy vs.loss regret). On the whole, these participants seemed to respond more to 
the alternative card rather than the feedback on the chosen card. 
One variable that stood out was the measure of sensitivity to reward. Participants 
who rated themselves as more sensitive to rewards also had larger residual scores 
between wins and losses on the chosen card and were more sensitive to the difference in 
the alternative card being a better versus worse decision (i.e., win joy vs. loss regret). 
Another variable that seemed to be associated with ERP components was neuroticism. 
Participants high on this trait showed smaller FRNs to low value wins and smaller P3s to 
wins in general. Additionally, these participants showed smaller FRNs to high loss and 
low win alternative cards. These relationships are not as easily interpretable as the ones 
summarized above and will require further investigation. 
Discussion 
This study was conducted in order to achieve two goals: (l) to determine if ERP 
components are sensitive to the valence and magnitude of rewarding stimuli replicating 
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the previous work done by Yeung and Sanfey (2004), and (2) to investigate the role of 
individual differences in the processing of valence and magnitude of the presented stimuli 
following large and small wagers as well as in the evaluation of the decisions (i.e., was 
the alternative option a better or worse choice). 
Valence and magnitude of the rewarding stimuli were found to be separable in the 
brain as the variance produced by each in the ERP components could be differentiated, 
but were not associated with specific ERP components. The valence of the feedback was 
differentiated by both FRN and P3 components, such that losses produced lager FRN s at 
all of the midline sites and larger P3 at Fz. Furthermore, positive and negative feedback 
for high wagers was associated with smaller FRNs and larger P3. 
These results are somewhat consistent with the original literature indicating that 
valence and magnitude are processed separately in the brain; however, this separation did 
not translate into a double dissociation between ERP components and reward 
characteristics (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004; Goyer et at, 2008). The early processing of 
magnitude of the wager was also consistent with previous literature; however, the 
magnitude effects found in this study for the FRN were in the opposite direction to the 
previously reported ones (Goyer et at, 2008). It should be noted, however, that even 
though there was a statistically significant main effect of magnitude for the FRN, the ERP 
overlays showed that FRN s for low value losses were considerably smaller than those for 
high value wins, whereas low and high losses were of similar amplitude (see Figure 2.3). 
Thus, it is possible that the effect of magnitude observed in this study occurred due to the 
difference between high and low value wins rather than large and small wagers. 
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The examination of the valence and magnitude of the alternative card revealed 
larger FRNs for low value cards. The latter fmding was consistent with Goyer et al. 's 
(2008) results. This reversal in FRN amplitude for the magnitude of obtained versus 
missed reward suggests that this component is sensitive to the context of the presentation 
of information and thus reflects evaluation of the stimulus in context rather than simply 
being a marker for magnitude processing. Holroyd, Larsen, and Cohen (2004) suggest 
that outcomes are determined along the dimensions of favourable/unfavourable such that 
the distinction between the two is apparent only after the alternative option is presented. 
Holroyd and Coles (2002) suggest that the ACC generated negativity observed at 
the scalp is dopamine-mediated and reflects reinforcement learning. According to this 
theory the FRN in risk-taking tasks should reflect learning via comparison of expected to 
the obtained outcome and thus should be mediated by subject's expectations. In this case, 
FRN sensitivity to the magnitude of the stimulus should be mediated by the context of the 
stimulus presentation as well as subject's tendency to expect negative/positive outcomes. 
Moser and Simon (2009) conducted a study examining the effect of win/lose 
expectations on the FRN magnitude in a guessing paradigm. Participants were asked to 
guess behind which one of the two doors was a 5 cent reward. A correct guess resulted in 
a reward, while after incorrect guesses participants did not earn or lose anything. 
Additionally, participants were asked to predict if they were correct or wrong before and 
after choosing the door. Their results showed that FRN was always larger to non-rewards 
than rewards. Its amplitude was further modulated by the expectations on the trial in 
which subjects were inconsistent in their predictions, such that FRN was largest when 
subjects initially expected to lose on the trial, but after choosing a door decided that they 
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were going to win. Thus, last minute changes in expectations produced larger FRN s when 
compared to consistent trials (i.e., predicting and expected wins/losses before and after 
the choice). 
The authors concluded that FRN reflects context-sensitive evaluation of behavior and 
therefore a larger need to adjust performance, as in the case of changing from the 
prediction from loss to more favorable expectation of win. The above described study 
supports the notion that FRN amplitude reflects expectations rather than processing of 
specific magnitude or valence of the stimulus. It is then not surprising that the effects of 
magnitude on FRN amplitude were modulated by the context ofthe card (i.e., chosen 
versus alternative option). 
The effects found in this study for the P3 component were also not as clear as 
expected based on Yeung and Sanfey's (2004) work. The sensitivity of this component to 
magnitude and valence of feedback was found to depend on the site of examination. More 
specifically, this component was found to differentiate between losses and wins but only 
at Fz. Analysis of the P3 at Cz revealed only the main effect of magnitude, such that 
feedback to higher wagers elicited larger P3s. In previous studies, researchers 
investigating the sensitivity ofERP components to reward magnitude and valence have 
also reported that the P3 component is sensitive to both valence and magnitude of the 
reward (Toyomaki & Murohashi, 2005b). Nevertheless, the results suggest that valence 
and magnitude of reward related stimuli are processed separately in the brain. 
It must be noted that when the P3 component was scored, no differentiation 
between P3a and P3b were made. Previous literature suggests that these two components 
are differentially affected by the complexity of the task, such that P3 amplitude at pz 
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decreases with task complexity whereas P3 at Fz increases overall (Segalowitz, Wintink, 
& Cudmore, 2001). The authors suggested that that the observed changes are due to 
reallocation of attentional resources from the stimulus processing to the 'attentional 
activities of the frontal lobe" (p.456, Segalowitz, Wintink, & Cudmore, 2001). In the 
current study, P3 at Fz was large for losses, which suggests that losses attracted more of 
the attentional resources requiring frontal lobe involvement than simple stimulus 
processmg. 
In conclusion, the results of this study did not replicate the clear dissociation of 
valence and magnitude of the feedback at the scalp found by Yeung and Sanfey (2004; 
i.e., specific ERP components), but do suggest that these two properties of the stimulus 
are processed separately in the brain. The data thus supports the separation of subjective 
value of the stimulus and prediction of potential outcome as separate stages in the risk-
taking behaviour. The processing of the magnitude of the stimulus is reflected in both 
components, but for different reasons. If the FRN is an indicator of discrepancy between 
expected and obtained outcomes, then the magnitude of the stimulus can mediate the 
participant's expectations. For example, because choosing small amounts instead oflarge 
ones is generally considered a less risky decision, participants might expect a higher rate 
of positive outcome. Thus, losing on the low value trials would be the more unexpected 
outcome and thus would produce a larger FRN because in this task the positive and 
negative feedback was assigned randomly. In future studies, researchers should also 
measure participant's expectations for each trial and the discrepancy between the 
expected and obtained outcomes in order to examine this hypothesis further. 
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These expectations are further mediated by personality variables (e.g., sensation 
seeking). A sensation-seeking tendency is one of the risk factors for problematic 
gambling (see Johansson et aI., 2009, for a review) and is often associated with more 
risky choices. Thus, choosing low cards on the task would be a more conservative choice, 
especially for those scoring high on sensation seeking scale. Receiving loss feedback on 
the low wagers was associated with larger FRN and P3 amplitude for sensation seekers. 
This could be a further indicator that FRN is mediated by expectations, such that 
participants that were making a more conservative choice, especially given their 
personality trait, would expect less to be penalized for it, thus eliciting larger FRN 
amplitude. 
Another example of support for this theory about the FRN is provided by the 
relationships between amount of cognitive distortions endorsed by participants and the 
ERP amplitudes produced in response to the feedback on the chosen card and the 
opportunity to evaluate the decision made. Participants scoring high on the gambler's 
beliefs questionnaire showed smaller differentiation between win and loss feedback as 
measured by the FRN amplitude. Furthermore, these participants showed larger 
differentiation between the win and loss valences of the alternative card. Thus, not only 
do they process wins and losses on the chosen card similarly, more attention is paid to the 
not-chosen card. 
The cognitive distortions measured by the questionnaire are illusions of control 
and emphasis on luck. One of the questions loading high on the luck subscale of the 
questionnaire is ''when I am gambling "near misses" ... remind me that if I keep playing I 
will win" (Steenbergh et aI., 2002). This belief would be reinforced by the revelation of 
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the 'missed' outcome and it is not surprising that these participants differentiated between 
'missed' wins and losses more. 
Apart from affecting participant's expectations, sensation seeking and tendency 
for cognitive distortions have been identified as risk factors for problem gambling 
(Johansson et al., 2009). Similarly, these researches have also shown that a higher 
number of obsessive compulsive traits reported by participants are also associated with 
problem gambling (Johansson et aI., 2009; Durdle, Gorey, & Stewart, 2008). Obsessive 
compulsive disorder is associated with hyperactivity ofthe OFC (see Fontaine, Mattei & 
Robert, 2007), area that is commonly implicated in reward processing and control of 
behaviour. Thus, maladaptive responses in risky but rewarding situations can be 
expected. The relationships among ERPs and the number of obsessive compulsive 
characteristics reported were similar to those between ERPs and cognitive distortions; 
participants that were endorsing more obsessive compulsive behaviours differentiated 
less between valence of the feedback for the chosen card and more between the 
alternative cards of different valences as shown by the residual scores using win and loss 
cards in each condition of the P3 amplitude. 
The most adaptive responses were seen in participants scoring high on the 
sensitivity to reward scale. Higher sensitivity to reward was associated with larger 
differences between the valence of the chosen card as measured by the residual scores 
calculated for the FRN amplitude. Furthermore, when provided with an opportunity to 
evaluate their decision, these participants differentiated more between alternative cards 
that would have been better or worse choice. Thus, these participants used the 
opportunity to evaluate their decision and learn from both the outcome of their choice and 
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the revelation of the alternative option. In fact, de Ruiter and collegues (2009) found that 
pathological gambling was related to reduced reward and punishment sensitivity induced 
by monetary gains and losses. This reduced sensitivity was indicated by hypo activation of 
ventrolateral PFC. Their results provide further support to the advantage in gambling 
paradigms provided by higher sensitivity to reward, suggesting that sensitivity to reward 
can act as a protective factor; however, more research is needed to support this 
hypothesis. 
In conclusion, the relationships between personality variables and ERP 
components in response to a gambling paradigm were not as clear had been predicted. 
However, the obtained results suggest that FRN amplitude is mediated by expectations 
and is a reflection of discrepancy between expected and obtained outcomes (e.g., making 
a more conservative choice but still losing). Furthermore, this paradigm was effective at 
eliciting ERPs that differentiated between valence and magnitude of the stimulus and the 
relationships observed between personality and ERP amplitude were consistent with 
literature on problem gambling. 
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Study 2: Simple Response Task 
Recently there has been an increase in interest in investigating the neural 
correlates of reward-related behaviour, as well as the developmental factors that can 
influence such behaviour. The majority of research conducted in this area is focused on 
the sensitivity of ERP components to various characteristics of reward-related feedback: 
magnitude, valence as well as context of the stimulus. However, reward-related tasks 
present participants with more information than just the feedback regarding the 
performance on the task. For example, in the period between the response and the 
presentation of the feedback, participants are engaged in prediction or at least in 
anticipation of the outcome. The design of the task can lead to responses associated with 
reward-related stimuli, besides those related to the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, 
other factors, for example developmental factors and individual differences, can affect the 
brain responses to the reward-related stimuli. Whereas there is little research done 
investigating specific personality differences and reward-related brain responses, some 
researchers have looked at the role of developmental factors in processing of reward 
related information (e.g., Bjork et aI, 2004, Galvan et aI, 2006). 
Bjork and colleagues (2004) used tMRI to investigate the difference between adults 
and adolescents in activation ofNAcc and mPFC during a reward-related task. On each 
trial participants were shown a cue that labelled the trial as either a potential win, a 
potential loss, or no gain/no loss. There were five cues in total: large win/loss, small 
win/loss and no gain or loss. The task required participants to press a key in response to a 
target that appeared after the first cue. The duration of the target on the screen varied. 
Additionally, the time period between the first cue and the appearance of the target 
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varied. This time was labelled the anticipation period. In order to gain a reward or avoid 
losing, the participants were required to press a key while the target was visible. If the 
response was too slow participants either gained nothing on the trial or lost a small/large 
amount depending on the type of trial. Activations ofNAcc and mPFC during the 
anticipation and feedback periods were measured using fMR!. 
The authors showed that during the anticipation on the win trials, the NAcc was 
more activated in both groups when compared to other types of trials; however, this 
activation was greater in adults than in adolescents. Once the feedback on the win trials 
was given, both groups showed NAcc and mPFC activation. The difference between the 
groups was found in response to loss cues and loss trials; during the anticipation period 
on the potential loss trials, adults showed deactivation of mPFC which was not observed 
in the adolescents. The same pattern emerged once the negative feedback (i.e., losing) 
was given. In other words, while adolescents showed similar activation of both NAcc and 
mPFC in response to rewarding stimuli, they did not process the negative consequences 
of the behaviour to the same extent as adults. Thus, developmental factors playa role in 
the anticipation of the outcome as well as evaluation of the behaviour. It is also possible 
that such factors also appear as individual differences (e.g., some young adults acting 
more like adults, others more like adolescents). One shortcoming of fMR! has been poor 
time resolution; thus, replicating the results with ERPs, a more time-sensitive technique, 
will provide a more detailed picture of the role such factors have on reward-related 
behaviour. 
In the current study, a modifided version of the task was used to further 
investigate the sensitivity of the ERP components to valence and magnitude of the 
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stimulus in a different context (when compared to Study 1). Unlike in the previous task, 
this one contains another condition with magnitude and valence information of the 
reward that is separate from the task goals (i.e., obtaining or not obtaining the reward). If 
the sensitivity of the ERP components to the valence/magnitude of the cue stimulus are 
similar to those elicited by the feedback of comparable valence/magnitude, it could be 
said that the characteristics of reward-related stimulus are processed equally regardless of 
the context of presentation (i.e., potential vs. obtained). 
In the current study, we examined the P3 and FRN (or MFN) components of the 
ERP, in response to the different reward-related cues and feedback. Relationships 
between these components and a number of personality factors (e.g., harm avoidance, 
sensation seeking) will be investigated. It is expected that the FRN component will be 
sensitive to the valence of the feedback as well as the cues and the P3 component to the 
magnitude of the cues. Previous work has shown that these ERP components are sensitive 
to the magnitude and valence of the stimuli only in the context of feedback (Yeung & 
Sanfey, 2004). 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were the same as in Study 1 (see pg. 18 for details) 
Materials 
The Task 
The Simple Response Task used in this study was adapted from Bjork et at. 
(2004) task (see Figure 3.1). Participants were fIrst presented with a cue that labels the 
trial as a potential win or a loss. There were fIve "types of cues: small win (+$0.50), small 
loss (-$0.50), large win (+$3.00), large loss (-$3.00) and zero ($0). For the fIrst 15 
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participants, wins were presented in green and losses in red; the colors were reversed for 
the remainder of the participants. Each cue stayed on the screen for 500 ms. Following 
the cue was the anticipation period that was either 1 sec, 1.5 sec or 2 sec in length. During 
the anticipation period participants saw a grey screen, without any fixation point. Prior to 
the start of the task, participants were told that a grey square with a picture of a green 
street light will appear on the screen after the cue. In order to win or avoid losing money 
the participants had to press a button on the response pad while the target was still on the 
screen. During the first trial the target stayed on the screen for 280 ms. If the participants 
responded within this time, on the next trial the target was visible for 10 ms less. On the 
other hand, if the participants' response was after the 280 ms period (Le., after the 
disappearance of the target), an extra 20 ms was added to the target duration on the next 
trial. These corrections ensured that participants won approximately one third of the time, 
as well as corrected the difficulty of the task according to each person's response times. 
The win or loss feedback was given to the participants 1000 ms after the 
disappearance of the target. Any trial where the response was made within the duration of 
the target was labelled as a win and any other or later response was labelled as a loss. The 
feedback stayed visible on the screen for 1000 ms, following which participants were 
shown their running total for another 1000 ms. The intertrial period was also 1000 ms. 
There were nine blocks of the task, with 45 trials in each, and the participants were given 
a break between each block. The length of the break was under the participants' control. 
Prior to the beginning of the task, participants were told that the amount won 
during each block of the task (i.e., before each break) would be recorded. At the end of 
the session participants were presented with nine cards and were asked to draw a card. 
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Each card contained a number of a block (i.e., a number from one to nine). The amount of 
money that they had won in that block was the amount they were paid for this task. 
Participant's knowledge of this process ensured that effort and motivation was relatively 
equal in each of the blocks. 
Personality measures 
See study 1 for details (pg. 19). 
Procedure 
After signing the consent form and being shown around to the lab, participants 
were familiarized with the EEG recording equipment. After filling out the demographic 
and handedness questionnaire, each participant was fitted with a 12S-channel Sensor Net. 
Participants were given the instructions for the simple response task and a chance to 
complete a 10 trial practice block. Upon the completion of the first task participants were 
given a longer break and were introduced to the pure gambling task (see Study I for 
details). Once the tasks were completed, the sensor net was taken off and participants 
were given a chance to wash up and take a break. The last stage ofthe session included 
filling out the questionnaire package, which participants completed once they felt 
comfortable. Finally, the payment and the debriefing form were given and the purpose of 
the study was explained. 
EEG Recording and analysis 
See study I (pg. 23) for details on the recording, data and analysis criteria. The 
segmentation and the processing of the data used the same criteria as in Study 1; 
however, in this case data were segmented for the presentation of the cue as well as the 
feedback. It must be noted that FRN refers to the negativity that follows the presentation 
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of the feedback and thus is an inappropriate term to use for the component elicited by the 
presentation of the cue. Thus, in the latter condition a negativity that occurred 200 - 300 
ms after the presentation of the cue is referred to as more general MFN component. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis of ERP components showed no outliers. Furthermore, the 
data were normally distributed for all components, with the exception of the MFN 
component for the small win measured at FCz, W = 0.93, p = .048. Additionally, the FRN 
amplitude for the win condition at CPz and loss condition at Cz was found to violate the 
assumption of normality, W= 0.90,p = .008 and W= 0.91,p = .012, respectively. Any 
relationships found with these variables should be interpreted with caution, especially the 
analysis with individual differences. The skewness and kurtosis for all of the ERP 
components were within the acceptable range (±1). 
ERP Data 
ERP amplitude to the cue. The stimulus-locked overlay of the averaged ERP for 
the five types of cues (Figure 3.2) showed a slight differentiation between large and small 
cues for the MFN at FCz. However, the magnitude and the valence of the cues were not 
consistently separated for any of the components. In order to examine this further, small 
and large cues were averaged in order to create win and loss groupings. An overlay of the 
averaged ERPs can be seen in Figure 3.3. This overlay showed a slight separation 
between wins and losses that started at the MFN component and continued to be seen at 
the P3, such that wins were more positive than losses. This separation was largest at 
about 500 ms after the presentation of the cue. Similar averaging was done in order to 
separate the cues based on the magnitude only (Figure 3.4). The MFN component in this 
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case did not clearly dissociate large and small cues at any of the channels with the 
exception of FCz; however, large cues produced a larger P3 (i.e., more positive) 
amplitude. The zero cues seemed to be treated differently from any of the groupings (i.e., 
by magnitude or valence) and did not produce a clear FRN or P3. 
A 2 (magnitude) x 2 (valence) x 4 (channel) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted for the MFN and the P3 components in order to statistically examine the 
effects observed in the overlays (see Table 3.1). The assumptions of sphericity were 
violated and thus the values using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction were used in the 
analysis of both the MFN and P3 sensitivities (original degrees of freedom and 
Greenhouse-Geisser E are reported). There was a main effect of magnitude, such that 
large values elicited a smaller MFN amplitude. Furthermore, there also was a main effect 
of valence, such that losses elicited a larger MFN amplitude. Additionally, there was a 
main effect of channel, such that the MFN amplitude was maximal at Fz and minimal at 
CPz (see Table 3.2). Furthermore, there was an interaction between magnitude and 
channel, as well as between magnitude, valence and channel. In order to examine these 
interactions further, a 2 (valence) x 2 (magnitude) repeated-measures ANOV As were 
conducted for each channel (see Table 3.3) 
There were main effects of magnitude at both Fz, and FCz, such that large cues 
elicited a large MFN amplitude; however, this effect was not observed at either Cz, or 
CPz. Similar patterns were observed for the valence of the cue, where losses were 
associated with larger MFN at Fz and FCz but not at Cz or CPz. However, there was an 
interaction between magnitude and valence that was observed only at Fz ,F (1,29) = 
5.98,p = .021. Losses and wins were differentiated by the MFN amplitude but only for 
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the large cues, t (29) = 3.80,p = .001, and not the small ones, t (30) = 0.42,p = .681. 
Thus, it seems that MFN is sensitive to both the valence and the magnitude of the 
stimulus; however, the degree of this sensitivity varies with the site. Overall, larger 
MFN s were observed for the losses, as well as small cues, with the largest MFN elicited 
by small losses. 
The overall ANOVA for the P3 amplitude (Table 3.4) did not show any main 
effects of magnitude, or valence. However, there was a main effect of site, where the 
maximal P3 amplitude was observed at CPz and the minimal at Fz. However, previous 
research (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) examined the P3 sensitivity at Cz only, rather than 
across several sites and thus 2 x 2 ANOVAs for each site were conducted (Table 3.5). 
Once again, there were no main effects of either magnitude or valence at Fz, Fez or Cz. 
However, there was a main effect of valence at CPz, where the P3 amplitude was 
maximal, such that win cues elicited larger P3 amplitude when compared to losses. 
In summary, the MFN component was shown to be sensitive to both the valence 
and the magnitude of the cues, such that largest MFN amplitude was elicited by small 
losses. The P3 component was not sensitive to the magnitude of the stimulus, but 
differentiated between wins and losses at CPz. The sensitivity of both components 
depended greatly on the site of examination. 
ERP amplitude and latency for the feedback. Initially the feedback was segmented 
into four different conditions: win feedback on win cues (i.e., gaining money), win 
feedback on loss cues (i.e., no loss), loss feedback on win cues (i.e., no gain) and loss 
feedback on loss cues (i.e., lose money). The overlay of the averaged ERPs for the four 
segments was examined visually prior to statistical analysis (Figure 3.5). The ERPs for 
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the loss feedback, for both win and loss cues grouped together and were associated with 
smaller FRNs and larger P3s when compared to the win feedback. Furthermore, the P3 
for loss feedback seemed to peak later than the P3 elicited by the win feedback. Based on 
these observations the ERPs were averaged into two groups: loss (i.e., for win and lose 
cue trials) and win (i.e., for win and lose cue trials) feedback. The overlay for the two 
conditions can be seen in Figure 3.6. The FRN component was larger and peaked earlier 
for the win condition. A similar trend was observed with P3 component. To statistically 
examine these observations, four 2 (valence) x 4 (channel) repeated measures ANOV As 
were conducted, examining the FRN and P3 sensitivities based on the amplitude as well 
as latency of each component. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used when 
sphericity assumptions were violated, original degrees of freedom as well as Greenhouse-
Geisser E were reported. 
The FRN amplitude differentiated between loss and win feedback (Table 3.6), such 
that losses were associated with smaller FRN amplitude. Furthermore, there was a main 
effect of channel, such that the FRN amplitude was largest at FCz (Table 3.7). This more 
anterior effect can be clearly seen on a topographical map (Figure 3.7). The examination 
of the FRN latency revealed a main effect of valence (Table 3.8): the FRN on loss trials 
peaked later when compared to wins. There was also a main effect of site, and a trend for 
the interaction between valence and site. Overall, the FRN peaks at Fz and FCz occurred 
later than those at Cz and CPz (Table 3.9). 
The 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOV A for the P3 amplitude showed no significant 
main effect of valence, (Table 3.10; Figure 3.8 for the grand average topographical 
representation). Similar to the FRN results, there was a main effect of site, such that the 
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P3 amplitude was maximal at Cz and minimal at Fz (Table 3.11). However, the latency of 
P3 differentiated between wins and losses (Table 3.12), such that P3 for losses peaked 
later than for wins (Table 3.13). There were no other significant effects. 
In summary, the FRN differentiated between wins and losses, such that wins were 
associated with larger and earlier FRNs. The P3 component was not as sensitive as the 
FRN to the valence of the stimulus; only the latency differentiated between wins and 
losses, such that the P3 peaked earlier for the wins. 
Individual Differences 
As mentioned previously in Study 1, participants 14 and 20 were responsible for 
the relationships with delay discounting and BAS, respectively, and thus were removed 
from the analysis when examining the relationships between any of the ERP components 
and these variables. Furthermore, sensitivity to punishment scores were not normally 
distributed and thus the correlations with ERP components were done using Kendall's 
tau. The scatter plots for the ERP amplitudes and personality measures for the significant 
relationships can be seen in Figures 3.9 through 3.32. 
ERP component elicited by the cue. The maximal amplitude of the FRN, observed 
at Fz, and P3, observed at CPz, were correlated with scores obtained on a number of 
individual differences questionnaires. The amplitude for each of the components was 
averaged in order to obtain four scores: large cue (averaging large wins and large losses), 
small cue, win cue (averaging small and large wins), loss cue. Following this, adjusted 
scores between the conditions (i.e., large vs. small and win vs. loss) were calculated by 
regressing one condition out of another (e.g., small was regressed out of large) and saving 
the residuals. The residuals were then correlated with the scores on personality measures 
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in order to examine the effects various characteristics have on the degree of 
differentiation between the conditions. 
There were no significant correlations between the ERP components for any 
condition an amount of money spent gambling (Table 3.14). The relationships between 
the ERP components and the residual scores can be seen in Table 3.15. Participants who 
reported having higher levels of cognitive distortions, r = .49, p = .006 (Figure 3.9), and 
conscientiousness, r = .38, p =.045 (Figure 3.10), differentiated more between large and 
small cues as measured by the MFN amplitudes. Similarly, those who scored high on the 
neuroticism scale showed less differentiation in the P3 component, between the 
magnitudes of the cues, r= -.37,p = .045 (Figure 3.11). Furthermore, participants with 
higher levels of obsessive-compulsive characteristics differentiated more, as measured by 
the MFN amplitude, between win and loss cues, r = .37, p =.050 (Figure 3.12). Similar 
relationship was observed between sensitivity to reward and difference scores for the P3 
amplitude: participants who reported being more sensitive to reward differentiated less 
between cues of different valence, r = -.42,p =.025 (Figure 3.13). Thus, levels of 
cognitive distortions and conscientiousness are associated with processing of the 
magnitude of the cue. Additionally, obsessive-compulsive characteristics, sensitivity to 
reward and neuroticism playa role in processing of the valence of the cue. 
Apart from relating to the residual scores, the measures of individual differences 
also were associated with the amplitude of ERP components elicited by the five types of 
cues. There were several significant correlations between the MFN amplitude at Fz and 
harm avoidance (Table 3.16). More specifically, participants scoring high on this scale 
showed smaller MFN amplitude to small wins, r = .49,p = .006 (Figure 3.14), small 
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losses, r = .43,p = .016 (Figure 3.15) and larger wins, r = .48,p = .007 (Figure 3.16). 
Thus, higher levels of harm avoidance were, in general associated with smaller MFN s to 
the majority of the cues. Similarly, participants who score high on sensation seeking also 
show larger MFNs to several cues: small losses, r = -.38,p = .044 (Figure 3.17), and 
large wins, r= -.45,p = .016 (Figure 3.18). Smaller MFN amplitude was also associated 
with high scores on the measure of cognitive distortions on the large win trials, r = .3 7, p 
= .045 (Figure 3.19). In other words, smaller MFN amplitude was associated with greater 
harm avoidance, reduced sensation seeking and higher levels of cognitive distortions in 
response to cues of various magnitude and valence. 
The examination of the relationships between personality and the P3 amplitude at 
CPz (Table 3.17) revealed that higher levels of harm avoidance were associated with 
smaller P3 amplitude for the small loss cues, r = -.36, p = .049 (Figure 3.20). However, 
those scoring high on sensation seeking showed larger P3 amplitude to this cue, r = .39,p 
=.042 (Figure 3.21). In general, higher levels of harm avoidance were associated with 
smaller amplitude of both P3 and MFN after the presentation of the cues. The relationship 
between the cues and sensation seeking is not as straightforward; the large loss cue 
elicited a larger ERP component for those high in these characteristics, while other cues 
were associated with smaller amplitudes. 
There were several relationships between the personality characteristics and the 
zero cue for both MFN and P3 components (Table 3.18): high scores on the measure of 
cognitive distortions, r = .43,p = .019 (Figure 2.22), as well as higher levels of harm 
avoidance, r = .44, p = .045 (Figure 2.23), and perfectionism, r = .36, p =.048 (Figure 
2.24), were associated with smaller MFN amplitude after the zero cue. These 
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relationships were not seen with the P3 component; however, higher levels ofBIS were 
associated with smaller P3 amplitude, r = -.42, p = .020 (Figure 2.25). Furthermore, 
higher levels of impulsivity, as measured by the delay discounting scale, were associated 
with larger P3 amplitude elicited by the zero cue, r = .42,p = .028 (Figure 2.26). To 
summarize, higher levels of harm avoidance, perfectionism, cognitive distortions and 
impulsivity as wen as lower activity ofBIS were associate with smaller amplitude of 
ERP components elicited by the zero cue trials. 
In summary, the cue stimulus informed the participants about the potential 
outcomes of the trial (i.e., gain vs. loss). Participants who scored lower on the harm 
avoidance and cognitive distortions and scored higher on the sensation seeking scale 
showed larger amplitudes of the ERP components to the cues that signified potential 
gains. However, scoring high on sensation seeking and low on harm avoidance (but only 
in case of small losses) was associated with larger ERPs. Zero cues (i.e., no change) 
elicited smaller amplitude of ERP components for those who scored high on harm 
avoidance, perfectionism and cognitive distortions and low on the delay discounting 
scale. The magnitude of the cue was differentiated more by those with high levels of 
cognitive distortions and conscientiousness. Individuals with higher levels of obsessive 
compulsive characteristics and neuroticism, as well as lower levels of sensitivity to 
reward differentiated more between the cues of difference valence. 
ERP components elicited by the feedback. The FRN amplitude observed after the 
feedback was maximal at Fz; however, the maximal P3 amplitude was observed at Cz. In 
order to be consistent with previous literature (e.g., Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Boksem et 
aI., 2008) and reduce Type I error all of the correlations were done using the ERP 
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amplitudes measured at Cz. The residual scores between win and loss feedback were 
calculated by regressing the ERP component's amplitude elicited by the wins out of the 
amplitude elicited by the losses. The saved residuals from each of the regressions were 
used as to indicate the degree of differentiation between the valence of the feedback (i.e., 
wins versus losses). 
FRN amplitude was found to be correlated with harm avoidance and sensation 
seeking (see Table 3.19 for correlation coefficients for all the personality measures). 
More specifically, higher levels of harm avoidance were associated with smaller FRN 
amplitude for both wins, r = 040, p = .028 (Figure 3.27), and losses, r = 042, p = .019 
(Figure 3.28), and sensation seekers showed larger FRNs after receiving win feedback, r 
= -AO,p = .035 (Figure 3.29). Similar examination ofthe relationships between the P3 
amplitude and personality variables (Table 3.20) revealed a relationship with harm 
avoidance and sensitivity to reward. Higher levels of harm avoidance were associated 
with larger P3 amplitude for both wins, r = .62,p = .001 (Figure 3.30), and losses, r = 
.36,p = .048 (Figure 3.31). Participants who reported being sensitive to rewards showed 
larger P3 amplitude for losses, r = A3,p = .021 (Figure 3.32). 
Summary. There were a number of relationships between the FRN and P3 
components and personality variables. Harm avoidance was one of the personality traits 
that stood out more often. Specifically, participants who scored high on this trait showed 
smaller FRN amplitudes to all of the cues, except large loss, as well as both types of 
feedback. However, these participants showed larger P3 amplitudes to the feedback, in 
general. Thus, it seems that while the cues were not as important for these participants, 
they paid more attention to the feedback of any type. 
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Another measure that related to the P3 amplitude for both cues and feedback was the 
sensitivity to reward. Higher levels of reward sensitivity were associated with larger 
residual scores comparing cues of difference valence as well as larger responses to the 
loss feedback. Overall, these participants processed cues based on the valence and paid 
more attention to losses. Furthermore, sensations seekers showed larger FRN s to the cues 
signifying potential large wins as well as win feedback in general. It must be noted that 
the same participants also showed larger FRN and P3 amplitude to small loss cues. There 
were a number of other relationships between personality and ERP amplitude; however, 
none of the characteristics related to the components were elicited by both the cues and 
the feedback. 
Discussion 
Magnitude versus valence sensitivity of ERPs 
Previous research (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) suggested that magnitude and valence 
of reward-related feedback is processed separately in the brain and can be dissociated by 
two distinct ERP components: the FRN and P3. One of the goals of this study was to 
further investigate the separation of magnitude and valence of reward-related stimuli. 
Unlike in Yeung and Sanfey's (2004) work, the paradigm used in this study gave 
participants a sense of control over the outcomes. Furthermore, participants were 
presented with cues of various magnitude and valence, which allowed the examination of 
the sensitivity of the ERP components to the potential reward rather than the reward 
itself. 
In general, it was found that both the P3 and the FRN component differentiated 
between the valence of the cue, where potential gains/wins were associated with smaller 
FRN and larger P3 amplitude. Larger FRN amplitude following a stimulus of negative 
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valence is a well documented finding in the current literature; however, in most of the 
studies only the effect of feedback on the ERP amplitude was investigated (Toyomaki & 
Murohashi, 2005a; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004; Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006). Results 
from the current study suggest that stimuli that predict potential reward and those that 
inform of reward attainment (i.e., feedback) are treated similarly in the brain, such that 
valence and magnitude of the stimulus are separable. It must be noted, that similar to the 
pure gambling task larger amounts produced smaller FRN amplitudes. Additionally, as 
the magnitude and valence could be differentiated by the ERP components, further 
support for the dissociation of these characteristics of a reward was provided. 
While the ERP sensitivity to the potential gains and losses was consistent with the 
literature, the relationships between these components and the type of feedback was more 
complicated. The FRN and the P3 amplitude did not differentiate between positive and 
negative valence of the feedback that was also associated with no monetary gains or 
losses (i.e., win on loss cues or lose on win cues). Previous research suggests that the 
FRN amplitude differentiates between outcomes that are generally positive or negative in 
nature (Hajcak, at aI, 2006) rather than other characteristics of the feedback. Furthermore, 
Holroyd and colleagues (2006) suggest that the FRN categorizes the feedback not based 
on the valence (i.e., gaining or losing money) but rather in terms of whether participants 
succeed or fail to achieve the goal assigned by the task (e.g., responding within the 
allotted time). Following this logic, it is not surprising that the ERP components elicited 
by the feedback were based on the valence of the outcome regardless of the type of trial; 
however, this still does not explain why losses elicited a more positive waveforms. 
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The sensitivity of both P3 and the FRN components to the valence of the feedback 
were not surprising either, given the results of the pure gambling task as well as recent 
research on the separation of magnitude and valence of the rewards (Goyer et a!., 2008; 
Kamarajan, et aI., 2009). However, the direction of the relationships was an unexpected 
finding: losses were associated with smaller and later FRN peaks. Furthermore, the 
amplitude of the P3 did not differentiate between the two types of feedback but losses 
were found to peak later than wins. This suggests that in this task the MFN obtained after 
the presentation of the cues and the FRN following the feedback were governed by 
different stimulus characteristics, rather than the valence. Several studies have suggested 
that the FRN is sensitive to the salience of the stimulus (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, 
Schurger & Cohen, 2004), task goals (Holroyd et aI., 2006) as well as participant's 
predictions (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002). Thus, previous research suggests that FRN 
amplitude can be modulated by a number of factors, one of which is the valence of the 
stimulus. While there has been research examining the FRN amplitude in a passive 
gambling task (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005), there has been no research in the 
gambling literature examining the ERP sensitivity to characteristics of the feedback when 
participants are given a sense of control over the outcomes. These results provide further 
support for the sensitivity of the FRN component to the task goals and the context of the 
feedback. Further research will be needed in order to examine the relationship between 
the FRN sensitivity and the degree of perceived control over the outcome of the task. 
Individual Differences and ERPs 
Similar to the previous study, the amplitude ofERP components was further 
modulated by a number of individual differences. Levels of harm avoidance and 
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sensation seeking were found to be related to the ERPs elicited by both the cue and the 
feedback. Nordin and Nylander (2007) found that pathological gamblers score high on 
harm avoidance as well as novelty seeking. The authors stated that the relationship with 
harm avoidance was not surprising, as this trait is often linked to patient groups. In the 
current study, participants scoring high on harm avoidance showed smaller FRN 
amplitude to all of the cues, except the large loss cues. While these participants process 
large loss cues similarly to other individuals, the difference between the responses 
elicited by these cues and other cues might indicate that more emphasis is placed on the 
worst outcomes. Thus, participants scoring high on harm avoidance process the worst 
outcome (i.e., large losses) in the same way as other participants, they discount the 
positive ones. This relationship is not counter-intuitive but would be considered 
maladaptive in a gambling situation, due to a bias toward one type of outcome, rather 
than the evaluation of all the possibilities. 
As mentioned previously, sensation seeking was another trait that was associated 
with both responses to cues and to the feedback. More specifically, sensation seekers 
showed larger FRN s to small loss and large win cues, as well as larger P3 amplitude to 
sman loss cues. The relationships observed between the FRN amplitude and this trait are 
hard to interpret, given the scarcity of research done on the relationship between ERPs 
elicited by rewarding stimuli and sensation seeking. Overall, it seems that sensation 
seekers find relatively risky situations engaging; however, at least in this population, they 
do process negative outcomes similar to other participants. 
Another risk factor for pathological gambling is the number/levels of cognitive 
distortions related to gambling that one reports (Johansson et aI., 2009). In the current 
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study, cognitive distortions were associated with larger differentiation between the 
magnitude of the cue as well as smaller FRN s to large win and zero cues. The participants 
engaged more in the processing of the magnitude of the potential outcome rather than its 
valence. This suggests that participants with higher levels of cognitive distortions find the 
size of the potential outcome more important than its valence. The illusion of control as 
well as belief in luck are the two cognitive distortions measured by the gamble's beliefs 
questionnaire (Steenbergh et at, 2002). In real life situations, cognitive distortions give 
gamblers a false sense of control over the outcome. In real life situations the size of the 
wager is determined by the person's decision, which is further depended on the levels of 
confidence in the win, mediated by the level of cognitive distortions. In the case of this 
task, size of the wager was predetermined and thus the magnitude of the wager could, in 
turn, mediate one's confidence in positive outcome. However, future research, measuring 
participant's levels of confidence in positive outcome prior to the feedback or given the 
option "to place a bet" of their choice, is needed in order to support this hypothesis. 
Overall, there were a number of relationships with specific components of the task and 
personality traits. However, these relationships were hard to interpret given their 
specificity (e.g., relationship with only one type of cue and one component but not 
others), lack of literature investigating individual differences in reward-related tasks as 
well as the potential for Type I error. The role of each of the measured personality 
characteristics is further discussed in the next chapter, where the results obtained from the 
two studies are compared. 
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General Discussion 
This thesis was done in order to examine if magnitude and valence of reward-
related stimuli are processed separately in the brain, how sensitive the FRN and P3 
components are to each of the characteristics, as well as the role that individual 
differences play in the processing of these characteristics. In Study 1, the pure gambling 
task was used to investigate the sensitivity of the ERP components to the outcome of a 
gamble as well as the alternative outcome. Participants were asked to choose between the 
two cards and had no control over the outcome. In Study 2, the simple response task 
participants were given a false sense of control over the outcome, where the win or loss 
on a trial depended on the participant's response times, but the task was adjusted to 
ensure a certain number of losses. ERP components to the stimuli representing potential 
gains or losses were examined in order to determine if the dissociation between the 
valence and magnitude of reward-related stimuli is specific to the feedback or to any 
reward-related information. Furthermore, similar ERP components elicited by the 
outcome of each trial were compared. This analysis allowed the comparison between the 
two tasks, and revealed the effect of task goals on the sensitivity of each component. The 
relationships between the above mentioned components and measures of individual 
differences were also examined. 
Valence vs. Magnitude 
In the beginning of this thesis reward-related behaviour was discussed in terms of 
several processes governed by neural circuitry as well as individual differences. The 
engagement ofthe organism in the assessment ofthe reward's value occurs directly after 
the presentation of a rewarding stimulus. Previous research implicates the NAcc (e.g., 
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Ernst, et aI., 2005), ACC and OFC/mPFC (e.g., Kable & Glimcher, 2007) areas as well as 
dopaminergic regulation of these areas in the processing of the reward value. 
The reinforc~ment learning hypothesis suggests that the MFN component in 
various tasks, especially in the reward-related tasks, is produced by the modulation of 
dopamine levels in the ACC (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). However, recently there has been 
a debate about the sensitivity of this component to specific characteristics of the stimulus: 
some state that it is sensitive to the fulfillment of task goals (Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 
2006), whereas others suggest it is modulated by the salience of the stimulus 
(Nieuwenhuis, et a!., 2004). In light of the current fmdings, it can be argued that when the 
outcome is uncertain the MFN component is sensitive to the valence and magnitude of 
the stimulus rather than other characteristics (e.g., color, task goals). In Study 2, simple 
response task, when the initial cue was presented (labelling the trial as potential win/loss) 
participants did not know whether the task goals had been fulfilled and the stimuli did not 
differ on any other characteristics (e.g., color, size). Since the information given to the 
participants was reward-related, it is plausible to assume that information was coded via 
the manipulation of dopamine levels (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Furthermore, the effects 
found for the potential gains/losses replicate those found for the actual outcomes (e.g., 
Goyer et at, 2008), which suggests that the MFN component observed after these stimuli 
is similar in nature, if not the same, as the FRN, further justifying the use of the more 
general term. 
It must be noted, that when the results of the simple response task and the pure 
gambling task are considered together, the context sensitivity of the FRN/MFN became 
apparent. Whereas valence and magnitude accounted for different variance in the ERP 
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components, suggesting the differentiation in the neural processes associated with these 
characteristics of the feedback, i.e., the FRN amplitude was larger for losses than for wins 
on the pure gambling task and vice versa on the simple response task. The results 
obtained in Study 2 (simple response task) were inconsistent with previous literature 
(Yueng & Sanfey, 2004) and those of Study l.However, it must be noted that all ofthe 
tasks used in the other studies did not give participants a sense of control over the 
outcome. Thus, other factors, apart from the valence and magnitude of the outcome, can 
influence the amplitude and latency of ERP components' amplitude and latency. In fact, 
the effect of other factors (e.g., expectations) might overshadow the role of magnitude 
and valence of the outcome. 
The activity observed at the scalp is a summation of the activity of several neural 
networks, each responsible for the processing of specific characteristics of the stimulus. 
After the evaluation of the value of the stimulus, the individual engages in the prediction 
of potential outcomes. Each process leads to an alteration of a psychological set and thus 
affects how further information is processed. Because this prediction and anticipation of 
the outcome occur after the evaluation of the stimulus, the psychological set of the 
participants at the moment of receiving feedback in Study 2 was different from that of 
Study 1. Consequently, the effect of these processes on the observed scalp activity might 
be stronger. In the pure gambling task the magnitude of the stimulus was known prior to 
the valence (i.e., if they would gain or lose money), but the valence was known after the 
prediction and anticipation of the outcome. In the simple response task, the valence and 
the magnitude of the stimulus were revealed prior to the response. Thus, the valence of 
the outcome was evaluated based on participants' expectations, rather than just the 
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presented feedback. Combined with the sense of control over the outcome, the 
participants' expectations could have played the strongest role in the processing of the 
feedback, resulting in the observed differentiations in the ERP components. Although the 
two tasks present relatively similar information in terms of stimulus characteristics (i.e., 
valence, magnitude) the ordering of this information leads to different psychological sets 
at the moment of processing of feedback, thus, leading to the difference in observed ERP 
components. 
The results of the two studies show that valence and magnitude of the outcome 
are not the only characteristics of the feedback that modulate the observed activity at the 
scalp. However, previous research shows that FRN amplitude is affected by the salience 
of the feedback (Nieuwenhuis, et aI., 2004). Thus, it would appear that the dopaminergic 
system is sensitive to the valence of the feedback, but is further modulated by the 
magnitude of the win or loss. The present results suggest that factors such as the task 
goals, the salience of the stimulus as well as the expectations of individuals also influence 
the nature of the response. Little research, if any, has been done in order to investigate the 
relative importance of each of these factors when it comes to the modulation of specific 
ERP components associated with neural responses to winning or losing in games of 
chance 
Further support for the importance of the above mentioned factors comes from the 
investigation of the ERP components elicited by the alternative outcome on the pure 
gambling task. In this case, FRNs were greater for smaller win/losses and P3 was greater 
for large wins. Furthermore, being informed that the alternative outcomes were better 
than the chosen ones produced larger FRNs and P3s. The latter finding provides more 
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support for the effect of expectations on the amplitude of the ERP components (i.e., 
participants expect that the chosen card is a better option until proven otherwise). Based 
on these results, it can also be suggested that the loss/no gain outcome in the simple 
response task is a reflection of regret versus joy rather than the processing of the valence 
of the stimulus. 
Overall, the influence of each step of the proposed model on the ERP components 
depended on the sequence of events of the task. For example, in the pure gambling task 
the sequence of presentation of information to the participants emphasized the valence of 
the feedback, as well as the evaluation of the chosen response. However, in the simple 
response task more emphasis was placed on the prediction and anticipation of the 
outcome, as the magnitude of the reward and the valence of the trial were known ahead of 
time. Thus, any model of reward-related behaviour will have to account for the 
differential responses associated with the sequence of presented information. 
Role of Individual Differences and Personality 
BISIBAS and related personality measures 
Previous research has shown that ERP components are modulated by individual 
differences in personality (Boksem, et at, 2008; Hansenne, et at, 2003; Hajcak & 
Simons, 2002). Although the BAS, sensitivity to reward and sensation seeking should be 
related, the correlations among these questionnaires, as observed in the current studies, 
suggest that sensation seeking and BAS measure separate constructs. The correlations 
with harm avoidance and sensitivity to punishment showed that both of these measures 
are positively related to BIS but not to each other. It must be noted that the limited 
number of participants included in this study could have reduced the power available to 
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observe some of the expected relationships so that these findings will need to be 
replicated with a larger sample before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
The correlations with ERP components were not uniform enough to suggest a 
simple model. More specifically, the relationships observed between the personality 
measures and ERP components were inconsistent. While sensation seeking and 
sensitivity to reward were significantly correlated, there was no condition in any of the 
tasks where these measures related similarly to ERP components. In addition, neither BIS 
nor BAS consistently related to the ERP components. As described previously, the BIS is 
thought to be distributed over several neural networks and not just that of dopamine 
(Gray & McNaugton, 2000). Therefore, ifMFNs reflect modulation specifically in the 
dopaminergic system, it is not surprising that BIS scores did not relate consistently to 
MFN components. However, the BAS was originally thought to be modulated by the 
dopaminergic system (Fowles, 2006), which is inconsistent with current findings. It is 
possible that effects of the BAS on ERPs are small and can be seen only when extreme 
groups are compared. Given that this sample did not contain a low BAS group (with 
lowest score being 25 out of 52), the effects of this measure might have been missed. 
Furthermore, the inconsistency of the relationships between the ERP components and 
individual differences suggest a large rate of Type I error and thus further replication is 
needed for distinctive conclusions. 
Harm-avoidance was the only personality variable that related somewhat 
consistently to the ERP components, although only in Study 2 (simple response task). 
The effects of valence and magnitude of the stimulus seem to be modulated by one's 
level of harm avoidance. More specifically, participants scoring high on harm avoidance 
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showed smaller MFNs in response to all type of cues (with the exception of the large loss 
cue) and win and loss feedback. However, the relationship between the valence of 
feedback and harm avoidance was seen only in the simple response task, which suggests 
that harm avoidance related to the MFN through modulation of individual expectations 
rather than the processing of the valence of the feedback itself. 
The results obtained for the ERP components in the simple response task were in 
conflict with the previous literature, as losses elicited smaller FRN and larger P3 
amplitude instead of the usual pattern, suggesting that task demands critically affect FRN 
and P3 amplitude. However, more research is needed in order to determine more 
precisely the exact characteristics of the task that modulate the FRN and P3 effects. 
Measures of real-life gambling behaviour, impulsivity and cognitive distortions 
The degree to which individuals spend money on gambling activities was utilized 
as a measure of real life gambling behaviour. Participants who spend more money on 
gambling showed a larger difference in FRN amplitude when comparing wins with losses 
in the pure gambling task (Study 1). However, there were no relationships between this 
measure and ERP components obtained in the simple response task. These results also 
provide further support for the hypothesis that the ERP components elicited by the 
feedback in the pure gambling task and in the simple response task are modulated 
differently. However, it must be noted that these relationships were driven by several 
individuals who gambled more than the rest of the sample. It is possible that participants 
who gamble more often are more sensitive to the difference in context of pure gambling 
versus what is seemingly a skill task (i.e., when outcome depends on the response time). 
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These relationships suggest that the pure gambling task is more representative of the real 
life gambling situations. 
Participants' impulsivity in this study was defined as the inability to delay 
monetary rewards and was measured using a delay discounting task. There were no 
consistent relationships between this measure and the ERP components. Previous 
research showed that higher levels of delay discounting were associated with lower levels 
of serotonin (Schweighofer, et aI., 2008). Thus, while gambling behaviour was found to 
be related to higher levels of impulsivity in an extreme group (Alessi & Petry, 2003), this 
relationship might not be as easily observed in reward-related tasks where the ERP 
components are thought to be modulated by the dopaminergic system. 
Relationships between ERP components and measures of cognitive distortions 
were also inconsistent and thus should be interpreted with caution. In the pure gambling 
task (Study 1), the overall score on the cognitive distortion scale was associated with less 
differentiation between wins and losses as well as larger differentiation between the 
valences of the alternative card. Thus, it seems that this characteristic influences 
processing of the valence of the feedback but not valence of the stimulus in general. In 
the simple response task, higher levels of cognitive distortions were associated with a 
larger difference in FRN amplitude between large and small cues. Taken together, the 
results suggest that cognitive distortions interfere with the processing of the valence of 
the stimulus differentially depending on the context of the stimulus (e.g., feedback vs. 
alternative card/potential outcome). It is possible that participants with more cognitive 
distortions are more sensitive to the change in the psychological sets that occurs between 
the conditions. Once again, more research is needed to further investigate this issue. 
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Other personality measures 
Another personality measure of interest was the level of obsessive-compulsive 
characteristics reported by the participants. Previous research shows that pathological 
gambling is associated with higher levels of the obsessive compulsive characteristics, but 
not with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Durdle et a!., 2008). In Study 1 (pure gambling 
task) participants with more obsessive compulsive characteristics differentiated less 
between wins and losses, as measured by the residual scores of the P3 amplitude to wins 
corrected for losses, but showed larger differentiations between the valences of the 
alternative option measured by the residual scores for the P3. Thus, once again the effect 
of this variable on the sensitivity of the ERP components is modulated by the context of 
the stimulus. 
The last set of personality traits of interest were neuroticism and 
conscientiousness. Previous research has shown that higher conscientiousness and lower 
neuroticism levels were associated with smaller changes in the ERN between different 
motivational conditions (Pailing & Sega10witz, 2004). In that study, the effects for 
conscientiousness disappeared after accounting for the effects of neuroticism. In the 
current studies, opposite effects were similarly shown for conscientiousness and 
neuroticism. Higher levels of conscientiousness were associated with larger residual 
scores between large and small cues in the simple response task. The opposite 
relationship was observed for the individuals scoring high on neuroticism (i.e., smaller 
residual scores between cues of different magnitude), although on a different component 
(FRN versus P3). Furthermore, higher levels of self-reported conscientiousness 
negatively correlated with the FRN amplitude to the small loss alternative card (in the 
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pure gambling task), whereas all the correlations observed with neuroticism were in the 
opposite direction. 
Summary 
The relationships between ERP components and individual differences were 
inconsistent not only when compared between the tasks, but also between different 
conditions within the same task (e.g., cue vs. feedback in the simple response task). The 
observed inconsistencies also suggest that the ERP components are modulated by the 
individual differences only within specific contexts. If it was the case that a specific 
personality trait was associated with larger amplitude of a component, then this 
relationship would be observed regardless of the context of the stimulus eliciting the 
component, as it would be a stable trait. However, in both studies the observed 
relationships depended on the context ofthe stimulus. For example, relationships with 
harm avoidance were observed only in the simple response task, while those with 
neuroticism only in the pure gambling task. Thus, the results of the current studies 
suggest that the sensitivity ofERP components is modulated by the context, and that the 
relationships with individual differences are also subject to this modulation. 
Conclusions 
Researchers have recently turned to the investigation of risk-taking behaviour 
from social, developmental and neurobiological angles (e.g., Durdle et at, 2008; Galvan 
et aI., 2006; Delgado et aI, 2003). Whereas this research has shed light on a number of 
aspects of gambling behaviour, some questions are as yet unresolved including the issue 
of how sensitive ERP components are to processes that occur during risk-taking 
behaviour (e.g., processing of the outcomes)? Also virtually unstudied is the role 
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individual differences play in these relationships and how they affect the risk-taking 
behaviour. In an attempt to answer these questions two gambling paradigms were 
employed. Our results indicate that the valence and magnitude are processed separately in 
the brain, as shown by the sensitivity of the ERP components to each of the 
characteristics without any consistent interactions. This conclusion is further supported 
by the effects of individual differences on each of the characteristics separately, i.e., the 
sensitivity of the ERP components to each is further modulated by individual differences. 
However, neither the valence nor the magnitude of the stimulus could be associated with 
a single specific ERP component. The correlations with individual differences varied 
depending on the context of the stimulus; this implies that the patterns observed at the 
scalp are context dependent and may reflect shifts in psychological sets. 
Furthermore, the comparison between the tasks revealed that the ERP components 
are also sensitive to the task goals. In the simple response task the magnitude and the 
valence of the reward could be separated at the stage of the cue (i.e., potential outcome). 
However, the ERP components elicited by the actual outcome did not vary as a function 
of obtaining the money but rather as a function of meeting the task goals (i.e., responding 
fast enough). While the processing of the reward valence and magnitude can be 
separated, these effects are superceded by an interaction with the task goals. Thus, a 
study ofERP effects needs to carefully consider not only the type of feedback (valence 
and magnitude) but also the task design and instructions. 
A number of factors involved in reward-related behaviour was proposed: 
subjective value of the reward, risks associated, predictions of the outcome. The results 
obtained in both studies suggest that the relative importance of the factors influencing the 
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ERP components depends on the task structure. The above-mentioned processes are 
involved in any risk-taking behaviour, where the outcomes are uncertain and the 
organism has to make a response. The majority of people are faced with similar decisions 
everyday but gambling represents a specific subset of these choices where individuals 
voluntarily put themselves in a risk-taking situation. From the results described above, 
one main conclusion can be drawn; individuals' reactions to a gambling situation are 
governed by the context of the behaviour, which in tum affects psychological set, and 
might further be influenced by personality characteristics. The observed modulation of 
the sensitivity of the ERP components by the context of stimulus presentation suggests 
that MFN and related ERP components are modulated by a switch in psychological set 
(e.g., from potential outcome, to evaluation of the decision). The fact that the correlations 
with personality were also subject to the context modulation further supports this 
hypothesis; individual differences in personality playa role in reward processing specific 
to the psychological set (or context), e.g., cognitive distortions have an effect when 
participant is evaluating behaviour but not during processing of potential outcome cues. 
The results of both studies suggest that MFN and P3 components are modulated 
by the psychological sets of participants and reflect processing of nonperceptual 
characteristics ofthe stimulus. However, the responses of these components are sensitive 
to the context of the stimulus presentation. Thus, rather than reflecting processing of 
fixed stimulus characteristics these components are sensitive to those important for a 
given psychological set. The same person can have different ERP reactions to similar 
outcome in a reward-related situation depending on the context, which modulates their 
psychological sets. 
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The psychology of gambling is a wide topic that encompasses many fields and 
directions as understanding psychology of gambling implies understanding the reasons 
for one's behaviour. This research provides a starting point between integrating the 
knowledge and measure of several fields in order to examine the interactions between 
them. Further investigation of the practical applications of the proposed model of risk-
taking behaviour as well as effects of various factors (e.g., neurotransmitter levels, 
personality, context) on each step will lead to more insights into the psychology of 
gambling. In conclusion, gambling behaviour should and can be examined from a variety 
of levels: neurobiological, personality and social. However, most importantly, all of these 
factors interact in order to produce the behaviour and thus the integration of knowledge 
among the fields is necessary. 
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l;'able 2.1 
Means and standard deviations of reaction times for various choices on the pure 
gambling task 
Type of Trial 
Large vs. Large 
Large vs. Small 
Small vs. Large 
Large 
M=1159.48 
SD=436.57 
M= 1137.26 
SD= 340.99 
Type of wager 
Small 
M= 1167.06 
SD = 433.15 
M= 1075.18 
SD = 378.12 
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Table 2.2 
Means and Standard Deviations for the FRN amplitude across various sites for the four 
feedback conditions 
Site Large Loss Small Loss Large Win Small Win 
Fz M= -1.37 M=-1.12 M= -0.49 M= -0.77 
SD=2.06 SD = 1.71 SD = 1.98 SD = 1.61 
FCz M= -0.09 M= -0.16 M= 1.48 M=0.92 
SD = 1.60 SD = 1.42 SD = 1.95 SD = 1.59 
Cz M=O.92 M=0.57 M= 2.28 M= 1.56 
SD=2.00 SD = 1.73 SD = 1.95 SD = 1.77 
CPz M=0.79 M= l.98 M= 1.98 M= 1.45 
SD = 2.19 SD=2.56 SD=2.56 SD = 2.18 
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Table 2.3 
Analysis a/Variance/or the FRN amplitude in response to the/eedback, broken down by 
site 
Site Source d/ F 1]'1 P 
Fz Valence (V) 1,28 4.04 .13 .054 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 <.02 <.01 .883 
VxM 1,28 3.45 .11 .074 
FCz Valence (V) 1,28 27.73 .49 <.001 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 4.84 .15 .036 
VxM 1,28 4.54 .14 .042 
Cz Valence (V) 1,28 11.12 .28 .002 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 13.l3 .32 .001 
VxM 1,28 1.33 .05 .258 
CPz Valence (V) 1,28 12.89 .32 <.001 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 12.39 .31 <.001 
VxM 1,28 0.05 <.01 .828 
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Table 2.4 
Means and Standard Deviations for the P300 amplitude across various sites for the four 
feedback conditions 
Site Large Loss Small Loss Large Win Small Win 
Fz M= 1.57 M= 1.63 M=0.79 M=0.67 
SD = 1.85 SD = 1.77 SD = 1.83 SD = 1.78 
FCz M= 5.13 M=4.52 M= 4.15 M=4.85 
SD=2.82 SD =2.49 SD = 2.37 SD= 2.14 
Cz M= 6.01 M= 5.36 M= 5.81 M=4.85 
SD= 3.09 SD=2.89 SD =2.48 SD = 2.14 
CPz M= 1.63 M=4.58 M= 5.61 M=4.80 
SD = 1.77 SD=2.54 SD = 2.89 SD=2.59 
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Table 2.5 
Analysis of Variance for the P300 amplitude in response to the feedback, broken down by 
site 
Site Source df F 2 1] P 
Fz Valence (V) 1,28 7.52 .21 .011 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 0.04 <.01 .836 
VxM 1,28 0.23 .01 .638 
FCz Valence (V) 1,28 12.18 .30 .002 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 38.96 .58 <.001 
VxM 1,28 1.02 .04 .320 
Cz Valence (V) 1,28 1.90 .06 .179 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 25.85 .48 <.001 
VxM 1,28 0.75 .03 .395 
PCz Valence (V) 1,28 1.44 .05 .240 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 16.19 .37 <.001 
VxM 1,28 0.20 .01 .659 
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Table 2.6 
Analysis a/Variance/or the FRN amplitude in response to the alternative card, broken 
down by site 
Site Source d/ F 2 17 P 
Fz Valence (V) 1,27 0.87 .03 .359 
Magnitude (M) 1,27 0.01 <.01 .914 
VxM 1,27 0.09 <.01 .769 
FCz Valence (V) 1,27 0.36 .01 .552 
Magnitude (M) 1,27 21.08 .45 <.001 
VxM 1,27 <.01 <.01 .979 
Cz Valence (V) 1,27 1.53 .05 .226 
Magnitude (M) 1,27 29.58 .52 <.001 
VxM 1,27 2.64 .09 .116 
CPz Valence (V) 1,26 0.64 .02 .432 
Magnitude (M) 1,26 15.78 .38 .001 
VxM 1,26 1.20 .04 .283 
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Table 2.7 
Means and Standard Deviations for the FRN amplitude across various sites for the four 
conditions of the alternative card 
Site Large Loss Small Loss Large Win Small Win 
Fz M= -1.18 M= -1.30 M= -1.01 M= -1.03 
SD = 1.58 SD = 1Al SD = 1.75 SD = 1.12 
FCz M=0.54 M= -0.30 M= 0.39 M= -0.37 
SD = 1.69 SD = l.32 SD= l.72 SD = 1.00 
Cz M= 1.41 M= 0.36 M= 1.39 M=0.02 
SD = 1.82 SD = 1.36 SD = 1.75 SD = 1.14 
CPz M= 1.07 M= 0.20 M=0.96 M= -0.10 
SD=2.05 SD = 1.44 SD = 1.58 SD = 1.17 
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Table 2.8 
Means and Standard Deviations for the P300 amplitude across various sites for the four 
conditions of the alternative card 
Site Large Loss Small Loss Large Win Small Win 
Fz M=0.83 M= 1.42 M= 1.31 M=0.60 
SD = 1.29 SD= 2.81 SD = 1.58 SD=0.99 
FCz M= 3.82 M=2.89 M= 3.39 M= 1.76 
SD=4.96 SD = 1.80 SD = 1.89 SD = 1.17 
Cz M=4.96 M= 3.58 M= 4.49 M=2.20 
SD=2.07 SD = 2.01 SD= 1.89 SD = 1.36 
CPz M= 4.49 M= 3.33 M=4.33 M= 2.14 
SD = 2.32 SD = 1.72 SD = 1.84 SD = 1.46 
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Table 2.9 
Analysis of Variance for the P300 amplitude in response to the alternative card, broken 
down by site 
Site Source df F r;2 p 
Fz Valence (V) 1,27 0.33 .01 .572 
Magnitude (M) 1,27 0.01 <.01 .936 
VxM 1,27 2.82 .09 .105 
FCz Valence (V) 1,28 8.22 .23 .008 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 36.92 .57 <.001 
VxM 1,28 4.14 .13 .051 
Cz Valence (V) 1,28 13.91 .33 .001 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 48.65 .64 <.001 
VxM 1,28 5.77 .17 .023 
CPz Valence (V) 1,28 10.97 .28 .003 
Magnitude (M) 1,28 44.82 .62 <.001 
VxM 1,28 7.40 .21 .011 
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Table 2.10 
Follow-up analysis of the interaction between magnitude and valence of the alternative 
cardfoundfor the P3 amplitude, broken down by site and valence 
Valence Site df F 2 1] P 
. Win Fez 1,28 39.17 .58 <.001 
Cz 1,28 87.44 .76 <.001 
CPz 1,28 110.02 .80 <.001 
Loss FCz 1,28 10.62 .28 .003 
Cz 1,28 12.68 .32 .001 
CPz 1,28 8.22 .24 .006 
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Table 2.11 
Correlations between personality variables and FRN amplitude at Cz for the feedback 
condition 
Questionnaire scores Large Small Large Small Difference Difference 
Loss Loss Win Win between Large between Win 
and Small and Loss 
Behavioural Inhibition -.25 -.12 -.31 -.07 -.39* -.14 
Scale (N = 29) 
Harm Avoidance .06 .13 -.02 -.01 -.06 -.13 
(N= 29) 
Sensitivity to -.07 .02 -.01 .19 -.14 .11 
Punishment (N = 29) 
Behavioural Activation -.21 -.15 -.14 -.37 .13 -.12 
Scale (N = 28) 
Sensation Seeking -.32 -.43* -.09 .08 -.07 .38 
(N= 26) 
Sensitivity to Reward .03 .02 .36 .18 .15 .39* 
(N= 27) 
Perfectionism (N = 29) .09 .09 -.05 -.09 .07 -.16 
Neuroticism (N = 28) -.37 -.22 -.29 -.39* -.11 -.14 
Conscientiousness .36 .18 -.19 -.17 .03 -.39 
(N= 27) 
Obsessive Compulsive -.01 -.01 .09 -.21 .40* -.04 
Characteristics (N = 28) 
Cognitive distortions -.09 -.07 .12 -.07 .14 .21 
(N= 29) 
Delay discounting (k) -.14 -.12 -.17 -.32 .10 -.16 
(N= 26) 
*p<.05 
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Table 2.12 
Correlations between personality variables and P300 amplitude at Cz for the feedback 
condition 
Questionnaire scores Large Small Large Small Difference Difference 
Loss Loss Win Win between Large between Win 
and Small and Loss 
Behavioural Inhibition -.23 -.19 -.14 -.04 -.24 .25 
Scale (N = 29) 
Harm Avoidance .03 -.03 -.16 -.10 .03 .26 
(N= 29) 
Sensitivity to .18 .09 .01 .16 .02 -.26 
Punishment (N = 29) 
Behavioural Activation -.33 -.35 -.31 -.34 .09 .08 
Scale (N = 28) 
Sensation Seeking .08 .15 .09 .19 -.32 .06 
(N= 26) 
Sensitivity to Reward .30 .26 .31 .35 .04 .07 
(N= 27) 
Perfectionism (N = 29) -.07 -.03 .09 .19 -.26 .38* 
Neuroticism (N = 28) -.38* -.36 -.43* -.38* -.12 -.04 
Conscientiousness -.08 -.08 -.01 .06 -.11 .22 
(N= 27) 
Obsessive Compulsive .11 -.01 -.16 -.15 .23 -.43* 
Characteristics (N = 28) 
Cognitive distortions .09 .l3 -.15 <.01 -.26 .38* 
(N= 29) 
Delay discounting (k) -.25 -.31 -.17 -.19 .17 .21 
(N= 26) 
* p <.05 
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Table 2.13 
Correlations between personality variables and P300 amplitude at FzJor theJeedback 
condition 
Questionnaire scores Large Small Large Small Difference Difference 
Loss Loss Win Win between Large between Win 
and Small and Loss 
Behavioural Inhibition .02 -.15 -.15 -.18 .15 -.17 
Scale (N = 29) 
Harm Avoidance <.01 -.27 -.15 -.18 .29 -.12 
(N= 29) 
Sensitivity to -.09 -.02 -.11 -.20 .10 .22 
Punishment (N = 29) 
Behavioural Activation .09 .31 -.03 .01 -.23 -.08 
Scale (N = 28) 
Sensation Seeking .19 .47* -.02 .03 -.25 -.12 
(N= 26) 
Sensitivity to Reward .29 .17 .13 .30 .03 .18 
(N= 27) 
Perfectionism (N = 29) <.01 -.09 .08 .15 .04 .15 
Neuroticism (N = 28) .17 .13 -.19 -.19 .02 -.28 
Conscientiousness -.21 -.35 .06 .05 .08 .16 
(N= 27) 
Obsessive Compulsive .33 .22 .02 -.10 .29 -.14 
Characteristics (N = 28) 
Cognitive distortions -.08 -.16 -.12 -.18 .09 .15 
(N= 29) 
Delay discounting (k) .06 .06 -.18 -.04 -.17 -.16 
(N= 26) 
*p<.05 
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Table 2.14 
Correlations between personality variables and FRN amplitude at Cz for the alternative 
card 
Questionnaire scores Large Small Large Small Win Lose 
Loss Loss Win Win Joy Regret 
Behavioural Inhibition -.13 .08 -.17 -.25 .01 -.37 
Scale (N = 29) 
Harm Avoidance <.01 .05 -.05 -.03 .17 .12 
(N= 29) 
Sensitivity to Punishment .08 .11 .04 .17 .19 .04 
(N= 29) 
Behavioural Activation -.16 -.17 .01 -.28 -.31 -.28 
Scale (N = 28) 
Sensation Seeking .03 .26 .12 -.12 -.26 -.32 
(N= 26) 
Sensitivity to Reward -.11 .14 -.08 .16 .03 .14 
(N= 27) 
Perfectionism (N = 29) .18 .14 .08 .09 .18 .07 
Neuroticism (N = 28) -.37* -.08 -.18 -.44* -.30 -.42 
Conscientiousness .21 .39* .01 .05 .39* .01 
(N= 27) 
Obsessive Compulsive .27 -.01 .37 .18 .12 .25 
Characteristics (N = 28) 
Cognitive distortions (N = -.11 .14 -.08 .39* .01 .19 
29) 
Delay discounting (k) -.09 -.18 -.06 -.37 -.28 -.20 
(N= 26) 
*p<.05 
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Table 2.15 
Correlations between personality variables and P300 amplitude at Cz for the alternative 
card 
Questionnaire scores Large Small Large Small Win Lose 
Loss Loss Win Win Joy Regret 
Behavioural Inhibition -.03 -.09 -.16 -.02 -.11 -.06 
Scale (N = 29) 
Harm Avoidance -.05 -.07 -.04 .01 -.01 .12 
(N= 29) 
Sensitivity to Punishment .26 .16 .11 .23 .23 .18 
(N= 29) 
Behavioural Activation -.02 -.08 -.02 .04 -.08 -.08 
Scale (N = 28) 
Sensation Seeking .06 .04 .03 -.09 -.02 -.21 
(N= 26) 
Sensitivity to Reward .21 .08 .22 .16 .25 <.01 
(N= 27) 
Perfectionism (N = 29) .17 .10 .11 .09 .12 .16 
Neuroticism (N = 28) -.15 -.07 -.03 -.06 -.18 -.14 
Conscientiousness .04 .14 .04 -.01 .07 .13 
(N= 27) 
Obsessive Compulsive .33 .01 .47* .52** .38* .44* 
Characteristics (N = 28) 
Cognitive distortions -.11 .17 .25 .26 .16 .13 
(N= 29) 
Delay discounting (k) -.08 -.01 -.05 -.19 -.16 -.04 
(N= 26) 
*p<.05; **p<.Ol 
101 
Table 2.16 
Correlations between personality variables and FRN amplitude at Cz for the differences 
between alternative card, as well as combinations of alternative cards relative to the 
chosen one 
Questionnaire scores Large vs. Small Win vs. Loss Joy vs. Regret 
Behavioural Inhibition Scale (N = 29) -.10 -.32 -.37 
Harm Avoidance -.26 -.25 .08 
(N= 29) 
Sensitivity to Punishment (N = 29) -.10 -.06 .19 
Behavioural Activation Scale .17 .06 -.09 
(N= 28) 
Sensation Seeking -.03 .13 -.01 
(N= 26) 
Sensitivity to Reward -.08 .10 -.14 
(N= 27) 
Perfectionism (N = 29) .04 -.11 .14 
Neuroticism (N = 28) .01 -.07 -.05 
Conscientiousness -.10 -.40* .16 
(N= 27) 
Obsessive Compulsive Characteristics .26 .25 -.12 
(N= 28) 
Cognitive distortions (N = 29) -.03 .25 -.26 
Delay discounting (k) .30 -.09 -.19 
(N= 26) 
*p<.05 
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Table 2.17 
Correlations between personality variables and P300 amplitude at CzJor the differences 
between alternative card, as well as combinations oj alternative cards relative to the 
chosen one 
Questionnaire scores Large vs. Small Win vs. Loss Joy vs. Regret 
Behavioural Inhibition Scale (N = 29) -.07 -.08 -.11 
Harm Avoidance -.03 .04 -.18 
(N= 29) 
Sensitivity to Punishment (N = 29) .08 .03 .06 
Behavioural Activation Scale .01 .06 -.03 
(N= 28) 
Sensation Seeking .08 -.09 .28 
(N= 26) 
Sensitivity to Reward .19 .12 .43* 
(N= 27) 
Perfectionism (N = 29) .10 .01 -.02 
Neuroticism (N = 28) -.06 .06 -.13 
Conscientiousness -.02 -.06 -.06 
(N= 27) 
Obsessive Compulsive Characteristics .35 .54** .04 
(N= 28) 
Cognitive distortions (N = 29) .16 .43* .15 
Delay discounting (k) -.02 -.09 -.21 
(N= 26) 
*p<.05 
**p<.Ol 
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Table 2.18 
Correlation coefficients between the ERP elicited by the feedback and the percentage of 
spending money usedfor gambling (N = 30). 
ERP 
Site 
Component 
FRN Cz 
P300 Cz 
Fz 
*p < .05 
Large Loss 
Small Loss 
Large Win 
Small Win 
Condition 
Difference between large and small 
Difference between win and loss 
Large Loss 
Small Loss 
Large Win 
Small Win 
Difference between large and small 
Difference between win and loss 
Large Loss 
Small Loss 
Large Win 
Small Win 
Difference between large and small 
Difference between win and loss 
104 
Percentage of money spent on 
gambling 
0.10 
0.20 
0.13 
-0.21 
-0.18 
0.06 
0.01 
0.10 
0.13 
0.05 
0.14 
<.01 
0.22 
0.19 
0.44* 
0.34 
0.23 
0.40* 
Table 2.19 
Correlation coefficients between the ERP elicited by the alternative card and the 
percentage of spending money usedfor gambling (N = 30). 
ERP Component Site 
FRN Cz 
P300 Cz 
*p < .05 
Condition 
Large Loss 
Small Loss 
Large Win 
Small Win 
Win Joy 
Lose Regret 
Large vs. Small 
Win vs. Loss 
Joy vs. Regret 
Large Loss 
Small Loss 
Large Win 
Small Win 
Win Joy 
Lose Regret 
Large vs. Small 
Win vs. Loss 
Joy vs. Regret 
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Percentage of money spent on gambling 
-0.15 
-0.10 
0.06 
0.20 
0.13 
-0.42* 
-0.08 
0.50 
-0.77 
-0.48* 
-0.16 
-0.11 
-0.09 
-0.39 
-0.23 
-0.35 
0.25 
0.06 
Table 3.1 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the MFN amplitude elicited by the cues 
Source d!effect, d!error F 2 Pll P 
Magnitude (M) 1,29 4.62 .14 .040 
Valence (V) 1,29 6.62 .19 .016 
Sites (C) 3,87 18.42 .39 <.001 .48 
MxV 1,29 0.63 .02 .433 
MxC 3,87 6.12 .17 .010 .50 
VxC 3,87 2.62 .08 .093 .57 
MxVxC 3,87 3.86 .12 .029 .67 
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Table 3.2 
Means and standard deviations for the MFN amplitude across the four midline sites 
elicited by the cues 
Type of Cue 
Site 
Small Win Small Loss Zero Large Win Large Loss 
Fz M=-2.96 M=-3.04 M= -2.88 M=-1.82 M= -2.75 
SD =1.86 SD=2.00 SD =1.78 SD =2.81 SD =2.59 
FCz M= -2.45 M= -2.61 M= -2.75 M= -1.57 M=-2.31 
SD =1.88 SD =2.12 SD =1.83 SD=2.47 SD=2.29 
Cz M= -0.98 M= -1.38 M=-1.41 M= -0.80 M= -1.10 
SD=2.06 SD=2.04 SD =1.84 SD =1.97 SD =2.22 
CPz M= -0.27 M= -0.57 M= -1.09 M=-0.65 M= -0.63 
SD = 2.15 SD= 1.94 SD = 1.92 SD = 1.78 SD=2.15 
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Table 3.3 
Repeated measures ANO VA for the MFN amplitudefor individual sites elicited by the 
cues 
Site Source d/effixt, F pr/ p 
d/error 
Fz Magnitude 1,29 7.63 .21 .010 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,29 12.44 .30 .001 
MxV 1,29 5.98 .17 .021 
FCz Magnitude 1,29 10.78 .27 .003 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,29 6.74 .19 .015 
MxV 1,29 1.74 .06 .198 
Cz Magnitude 1,29 2.02 .07 .166 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,29 2.08 .07 .160 
MxV 1,29 0.25 .01 .619 
CPz Magnitude 1,29 0.91 .03 .348 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,29 0.05 <.01 .820 
MxV 1,29 1.26 .04 .272 
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Table 3.4 
Repeated measures ANOVAfor the P300 amplitude elicited by the cues 
Source d/eJject, d/error F pr/ p 
Magnitude (M) 1,30 0.84 .03 .367 
Valence (V) 1,30 0.96 .03 .336 
Sites (C) 3,90 79.30 .73 <.001 .53 
MxV 1,30 1.38 .04 .249 
MxC 3,90 0.11 <.01 .836 .49 
VxC 3,90 3.46 .10 .041 .63 
MxVxC 3,90 0.53 .02 .593 .67 
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Table 3.5 
Repeated measures ANOVAfor the P300 amplitude for the individual sites elicited by the 
cues 
Site Source d/effect, F 2 11 P 
d/error 
Fz Magnitude 1,30 0.33 .01 .570 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,30 <.001 <.01 >.999 
MxV 1,30 2.27 .07 .142 
FCz Magnitude 1,30 0.26 .01 .613 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,30 <0.01 <.01 .965 
MxV 1,30 1.07 .04 .309 
Cz Magnitude 1,30 0.45 .02 .508 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,30 0.96 .03 .334 
MxV 1,30 0.47 .02 .499 
CPz Magnitude 1,30 0.82 .03 .374 
(M) 
Valence (V) 1,30 5.91 .17 .021 
MxV 1,30 0.11 <.01 .746 
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Table 3.6 
Repeated measures ANO VA for the FRN amplitude elicited by feedback 
Source d/effect, 
F 2 pyt P 
d/error 
Valence (V) 1,28 7.40 .21 .Oll 
Sites (C) 3,84 12.41 .31 <.001 .45 
VxC 3,84 0.85 .03 .426 .61 
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Table 3.7 
Means and standard deviations for the FRN amplitude across the four midline sites 
elicited by the feedback 
Type ofF eedback 
Site 
Win Loss 
Fz M=-1.81 M= -1.57 
SD= 1.64 SD= 1.95 
FCz M=-1.12 M= -0.58 
SD = 1.87 SD = 2.01 
Cz M= 0.19 M=0.90 
SD=2.52 SD = 2.47 
CPz M= 0.17 M=0.67 
SD=2.70 SD=2.68 
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Table 3.8 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN latency elicited by the feedback 
Source d/effec(, F 2 PI] P 
d/error 
Valence (V) 1,28 5.86 .17 .022 
Sites (C) 3,84 7.33 .21 .006 .45 
VxC 3,84 3.39 .11 .053 .53 
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Table 3.9 
Means and standard deviations for the FRN latency for individual sites for the feedback 
Type ofF eedback 
Site 
Win Loss 
Fz M=248.90 M=274.45 
SD = 33.07 SD = 50.55 
FCz M=248.65 M=269.87 
SD = 30.33 SD = 38.09 
Cz M=243.68 M= 257.61 
SD = 24.44 SD = 38.92 
CPz M= 237.94 M=244.52 
SD = 33.46 SD = 43.03 
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Table 3.10 
Repeated measures ANOVAfor the P300 amplitude elicited by the feedback 
Source d/effec(, F pr/ p 
d/error 
Valence (V) 1,28 2.50 .08 .125 
Sites (C) 3,84 62.70 .69 <.001 .64 
VxC 3,84 2.54 .08 .104 .50 
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Table 3.11 
Means and standard deviations for the P300 amplitude elicited by the feedback 
Type of Feedback 
Site 
Win Loss 
Fz M= l.41 M= 1.82 
SD =2.15 SD =2.32 
FCz M=3.96 M=4.84 
SD = 2.39 SD =2.75 
Cz M=6.06 M= 6.25 
SD = 2.12 SD =2.89 
CPz M= 5.79 M= 5.70 
SD =2.01 SD =2.47 
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Table 3.12 
Repeated measures ANOVAfor the P300 latency elicited by the feedback 
Source #effect, F p1J2 P 
#error 
Valence (V) 1,28 18.01 .39 <.001 
Sites (C) 3,84 1.83 .06 .148 .51 
VxC 3,84 1.94 .07 .160 .59 
117 
Table 3.13 
Means and standard deviations for the P300 latency elicited by the feedback 
Type of Feedback 
Site 
Win Loss 
Fz M= 329.20 M= 377.53 
SD = 37.99 SD = 67.60 
FCz M=240.58 M= 387.68 
SD = 35.20 SD = 44.40 
Cz M= 344.65 M= 376.19 
SD = 34.48 SD = 38.74 
CPz M= 342.06 M= 375.87 
SD = 36.48 SD=47.79 
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Table 3.14 
Correlation coefficients between the ERPs and the percentage of spending money used 
for gambling (N = 30). 
ERP Component Site Condition 
Percentage of money spent on 
gambling 
MFN Fz Small Win Cue .06 
Small Loss Cue .03 
Zero Cue .21 
Large Win Cue .21 
Large Loss Cue .15 
Large vs. Small Cues .19 
Win vs. Loss Cues .01 
FRN Cz Lose Feedback .03 
Win Feedback .09 
Win vs. Loss -.08 
Feedback 
P300 CPz Small Win Cue -.10 
Small Loss Cue -.10 
Zero Cue -.17 
Large Win Cue -.17 
Large Loss Cue -.21 
Large vs. Small Cues .31 
Win vs. Loss Cues .27 
Cz Lose Feedback -.20 
Win Feedback -.16 
Win vs. Loss -.13 
Feedback 
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Table 3.15 
Correlation coefficients between personality and the difference score elicited by the cues 
MFN Difference scores at Fz P300 Difference scores at CPz 
Questionnaire scores 
Large vs. Small Win vs. Large Large vs. Small Win vs. Large 
BIS (N= 30) -.09 -.23 -.23 -.26 
Harm A voidance (N = 30) .09 -.23 .12 .06 
Sensitivity to Punishment .04 -.08 -.15 -.10 
(N= 30) 
BAS (N= 29) -.21 .16 -.29 -.20 
Sensation Seeking (N = 28) -.10 .14 -.37 -.31 
Sensitivity to Reward .14 -.16 -.27 -.42* 
(N= 29) 
Perfectionism (N = 30) .25 -.07 .18 -.14 
Neuroticism (N = 30) -.11 -.07 -.37* -.03 
Conscientiousness (N = 29) .38* -.01 .26 -.18 
Obsessive Compulsive 
.12 .37* .30 .12 
Characteristics (N = 30) 
Cognitive distortions .49* .24 .29 -.01 
(N= 30) 
Delay discounting (k) .05 -.08 -.06 .16 
(N= 28) 
*p < .05 
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Table 3.16 
Correlation coefficients between personality and the MFN amplitude at Fz elicited by the 
cues 
Questionnaire scores Small Win Small Loss Large Win Large Loss 
BIS (N= 30) .07 .06 <.01 -.03 
Harm Avoidance (N = 30) .49** .43* .48** .33 
Sensitivity to Punishment -.08 <.01 -.02 -.11 
(N= 30) 
BAS (N=29) .01 -.06 -.20 .01 
Sensation Seeking (N = 28) -.28 -.38* -.45* -.25 
Sensitivity to Reward .16 .10 .20 .25 
(N= 29) 
Perfectionism (N = 30) .31 .28 .32 .35 
Neuroticism (N = 30) .06 .02 -.03 .04 
Conscientiousness (N = 29) .29 .08 .25 .27 
Obsessive Compulsive Characteristics .25 .34 .26 .24 
(N= 30) 
Cognitive distortions .19 .17 .37* .36 
(N= 30) 
Delay discounting (k) -.08 <.01 -.02 -.11 
(N= 28) 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 3.17 
Correlation coefficients between the personality variables and the P300 amplitude at 
CPz elicited by the cues 
Questionnaire scores Small Win Small Loss Large Win Large Loss 
BIS (N= 30) -.25 -.21 -.18 -.20 
Harm Avoidance (N = 30) <.01 -.36* -.06 .18 
Sensitivity to Punishment .02 .02 .18 .11 
(N= 30) 
BAS (N=29) -.32 -.10 -.33 -.34 
Sensation Seeking (N = 28) -.03 .39* .17 -.06 
Sensitivity to Reward .09 .09 .22 .02 
(N= 29) 
Perfectionism (N = 30) .01 -.32 -.01 -.15 
Neuroticism (N = 30) -.15 -.03 -.05 .06 
Conscientiousness (N = 29) .21 -.12 .11 -.21 
Obsessive Compulsive Characteristics .15 .02 -.12 -.09 
(N= 30) 
Cognitive distortions .12 -.10 .22 -.05 
(N= 30) 
Delay discounting (k) .02 .20 .05 .20 
(N= 28) 
*p < .05 
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Table 3.18 
Correlation coefficients between personality and the ERP amplitude elicited by the zero 
cues 
Questionnaire scores 
BIS (N= 30) 
Harm Avoidance (N = 30) 
Sensitivity to Punishment 
(N= 30) 
BAS (N= 29) 
Sensation Seeking (N = 28) 
Sensitivity to Reward 
(N= 29) 
Perfectionism (N = 30) 
Neuroticism (N = 30) 
Conscientiousness (N = 29) 
Obsessive Compulsive 
Characteristics (N = 30) 
Cognitive distortions 
(N= 30) 
Delay discounting (k) 
(N= 2S) 
*p < .05 
MFN amplitude at Fz P300 amplitude at CPz 
.07 -.42* 
.44* .11 
-.03 .08 
-.15 
-.29 
.21 
.36* 
-.09 
.18 
.28 
.43* 
.03 
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-.22 
-.16 
.18 
-.29 
.OS 
-.03 
.21 
.07 
.42* 
Table 3.19 
Correlation coefficients between the personality variables and the FRN amplitude at Cz 
elicited by the feedback 
Questionnaire scores Win Loss Win vs. Loss 
BIS (N= 30) -.25 -.34 -.24 
Harm Avoidance (N = 30) .40* .42* .17 
Sensitivity to Punishment -.09 -.12 .05 
(N= 30) 
BAS (N= 29) -.05 -.13 -.17 
Sensation Seeking (N = 28) -.40* -.29 .06 
Sensitivity to Reward .22 .23 .10 
(N= 29) 
Perfectionism (N = 30) -.02 -.03 -.02 
Neuroticism (N = 30) <.01 -.08 -.15 
Conscientiousness (N = 29) .11 .15 .12 
Obsessive Compulsive Characteristics -.10 -.01 .14 
(N= 30) 
Cognitive distortions -.12 <.01 .18 
(N= 30) 
Delay discounting (k) .09 .05 -.07 
(N= 28) 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 3.20 
Correlation coefficients between the personality variables and the P300 amplitude at Cz 
elicited by the feedback 
Questionnaire scores 
BIS (N= 30) 
Harm Avoidance (N = 30) 
Sensitivity to Punishment 
(N= 30) 
BAS (N= 29) 
Sensation Seeking (N = 28) 
Sensitivity to Reward 
(N= 29) 
Perfectionism (N = 30) 
Neuroticism (N = 30) 
Conscientiousness (N = 29) 
Obsessive Compulsive Characteristics 
(N= 30) 
Cognitive distortions 
(N= 30) 
Delay discounting (k) 
(N= 28) 
*p < .05 
** P < .01 
Win 
.21 
.62** 
.18 
-.06 
-.08 
.34 
.29 
.16 
.07 
.06 
-.06 
-.08 
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Loss 
.10 
.36* 
.17 
.15 
-.01 
.43* 
.15 
-.05 
.10 
.07 
-.11 
-.04 
Win vs. Loss 
-.11 
-.20 
.02 
.31 
.08 
.26 
-.13 
-.26 
.07 
.05 
-.11 
.04 
Figure 2.1 
The sequence of events during a trial of the pure gambling task. 
$1.95 
-$1.95 
-$1. 95 
1000 ms 
+$0.55 -$1.95 
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Figure 2.2 
Comparison of mean reaction times with standard deviations for different wagers during 
the pure gambling task 
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Figure 2.3 
Averaged ERP waveforms for the four types of feedback received during the pure 
gambling task 
Fz 
FCz 
Cz 
CPz 
Large Wins 
Small Wins 
Large Loss 
____ . ......L _ ~ '""'.. Small Loss 
''''''''''''' '''''lIiii''''- ' :::Z;::: " . ,,~..r.; 
I i , , , , I , , , , , 
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 
Note: FRN component differentiates between wins and losses on the majority of the 
channels, while the P3 component differentiates valence at Fz, but is more sensitive to the 
amplitude of the wager on the other channels. 
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Figure 2.4 
Grand average topographical map of the difference in the FRN between loss and win 
feedback in the pure gambling task (Study 1). 
269.0 ms 
EEG - Voltage 11111111111 
reference free 
0.10 !IV I step 
Note. The difference in the FRN amplitude between win and loss conditions was used for 
the topographical maps because the FRN amplitudes observed in these conditions were 
above the baseline (i.e., but much less positive than the preceding P2 and following P3). 
Losses elicited large FRN amplitude (i.e., more negative) when compared to wins. 
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Figure 2.5 
Grand average topographical map of the P 3 for the feedback given after large and small 
wagers in the pure gambling task (Study 1). 
a. Large 
352.0 ms 
EEG - Voltage 
b. Small 
350.0 ms 
EEG - Voltage 
reference free 
0.50 IIV I step 
reference free 
0.50 IIV I step 
Note. Feedback following large wagers elicited larger P3 amplitude. 
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Figure 2.6 
Grand average topographical map of the P 3 for the win and loss feedback conditions of 
the pure gambling task. 
a) Win 
352.0 ms 
EEG . Voltage 
b) Loss 
352.0 ms 
EEG • Voltage 
reference free 
0.50 "V I step 
reference free 
0.50 "V I step 
Note. Losses elicited larger P3 amplitude, but this effect was observed only at Fz and Fez 
(Table 2.5). 
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Figure 2.7 
Average ERP waveforms for the four types of the alternative card presented during the 
pure gambling task 
Large Loss 
Small Loss 
Large Win 
Fz 
[ A. . Small Win 
~ a:z>-
Cz 
CPz 
I i I I I I I I I I I I 
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 
Note: The ERP componnets (i.e., FRN and P300) are separating the four types of 
alternative cards at all of the channels wiht the expection of Fz. 
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Figure 2.8 
Average ERP waveforms for the four types of the alternative card presented during the 
pure gambling task 
Win .Joy 
(Alternative worse than chosen outcome) 
Loss Regret 
(Alternative better than chosen outcome) 
Fz 
FCz 
Cz 
CPz 
I i I I I I I I I I I I 
·100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 
Note: When the alternative card was a better choice and the chosen card was a loss (i.e., 
loss regret condition) there is an overall positivity starting at around 200 ms after the 
presentation of the alternative card and lasts for about 300 ms. 
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Figure 2.9 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz during the small losses and sensation seeking 
scores 
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Figure 2.10 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Fz during the small losses and sensation seeking 
scores 
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Figure 2.11 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz during the small wins and neuroticism scores 
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Figure 2.12 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz during the small wins and neuroticism scores 
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Figure 2.13 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz during large wins and neuroticism scores 
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Figure 2.14 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz during large losses and neuroticism scores 
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Figure 2.15 
Scatter plots for the difference in FRN amplitude at Cz between feedback on large and 
small wagers and BIS scores 
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Figure 2.16 
Scatter plots for the difference in FRN amplitude at Cz between feedback on large and 
small wagers and scores on the obsessive compulsive characteristic measure 
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Figure 2.17 
Scatter plots for the difference in FRN amplitude at Cz between win and loss feedback 
and sensitivity to reward scores 
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Figure 2.18 
Scatter plots for the difference in P300 amplitude at Cz between wins and losses and 
levels of reported cognitive distortions 
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Figure 2.19 
Scatter plots for the difference in P300 amplitude at Cz between wins and losses and 
levels of obsessive compulsive characteristics 
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Figure 2.20 
Scatter plots for the difference in P300 amplitude at Cz between wins and losses and 
perfectionism scores 
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Figure 2.21 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Fz for large wins and percentage of spending 
money used for gambling 
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Figure 2.22 
Scatter plots for the difference in P300 amplitude at Fz between win and loss feedback 
and percentage of spending money used for gambling 
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Figure 2.23 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz for alternative cards of large losses and 
neuroticism scores 
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Figure 2.24 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz for alternative cards of small wins and 
neuroticism scores 
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Figure 2.25 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz for alternative cards of small loss and 
conscientiousness scores 
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Figure 2.26 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz for alternative cards of small wins and levels of 
reported cognitive distortions 
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Figure 2.27 
Scatter plots/or the P300 amplitude at Cz/or alternative cards a/large wins and scores 
on the measure 0/ obsessive compulsive characteristics 
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Figure 2.28 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz for alternative cards of small wins and scores 
on the measure of obsessive compulsive characteristics 
1) 130.00 
(lJ 
.... ) 
(1) 
·tl 50.00-
r1' 
~ 
u 
ro 
L 
ro U 40.00 
(1) 
E 30.00-
o 
U 
'1) 
.~ 
U) 
V) 20.00-
(1) 
en 
....0 
o 
(1) 0.00-
o 
o 
o o 
o 
'0 
o o 
o 
o 
o 0 
R Sq Linear = 0.218 
0.00 2.00 4.00 13.00 
P:300 ,Amplitue at Cz fot- the Small 'Win (alternativ'e card) 
153 
Figure 2.29 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz for the win joy condition and conscientiousness 
scores 
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Figure 2.30 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz for the win joy condition and scores on the 
measure of obsessive compulsive characteristics 
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Figure 2.31 
Scatter plots for the P 3 00 amplitude at Cz for the lose regret condition and scores on the 
measure of obsessive compulsive characteristics 
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Figure 2.32 
Scatter plots for the difference in FRN amplitude at Cz between win and loss alternative 
cards and conscientiousness scores 
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Figure 2.33 
Scatter plots for the difference in P300 amplitude at Cz between win and loss alternative 
cards and scores on the measure of obsessive compulsive characteristics 
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Figure 2.34 
Scatter plots for the difference in P300 amplitude at Cz between win and loss alternative 
cards and levels of reported cognitive distortions 
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Figure 2.35 
Scatter plots/or the difference in P300 amplitude at Cz between win joy and loss regret 
conditions and sensitivity to reward scores 
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Figure 2.36 
Scatter plots for the P 300 amplitude at Cz for alternative cards of large losses and 
percentage of spending money used for gambling 
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Figure 2.37 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz for loss regret condition and percentage of 
spending money used for gambling 
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Figure 3.1 
The sequence of events during a trial of the simple response task. 
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Figure 3.2 
Stimulus locked overlay of the averaged ERP waveforms for the five types of cues. 
Fz 
FCz 
Cz 
CPz 
I i 
·100 0 
Large Win 
Large Loss 
Small Win h. Small Loss 
I I I I I I I I I I 
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 
Note. The FRN differentiates between large and small cues at Fez, but not at any other 
channel. There are no clear groupings of the P300 by magnitude or the valence of the cue. 
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Figure 3.3 
Stimulus locked overlay of the ERP waveforms to the cue, averaged over trials based on 
the valence of the cue. 
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Note. Wins and losses are not clearly differentiated at all the FRN, however the losses are 
slightly more negative than the wins. Similar observations can be made for the P300 
amplitude, where the differentiation is not clear at the peaks but wins are consistently 
slightly more positive. 
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Figure 3.4 
Stimulus locked overlay of the ERP waveforms to the cues, averaged over trials based on 
the magnitude of the cue. 
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Note. Large cues were associated with smaller FRN amplitude as well as smaller P300 
amplitude. On the other hand, zero cues elicited larger FRN and P300 amplitudes. 
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Figure 3.5 
Stimulus locked overlay of the averaged ERP waveforms for the feedback on the four 
trials. 
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Note. The feedback to the loss cues produced smaller FRN amplitude and larger P300 
amplitude, both of which peak later than the feedback to the win cues. 
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Figure 3.6 
Stimulus locked overlay of the ERP waveforms, averaged based on the valence of the 
feedback. 
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Note Loss feedback is associated with smaller FRN amplitude, larger P300 amplitude, as 
well as later peaks for the both components. 
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Figure 3.7 
Grand average topographical map of the difference in the FRN amplitude between win 
and loss feedback in the simple response task (Study 2). 
242.0 ms 
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Note. Losses elicited smaller FRN amplitude than wins, in contrast to the results 
observed in the pure gambling task. 
169 
Figure 3.8 
Grand average topographical map of the P3for the win and lossfeedback conditions of 
the simple response task (Study 2). 
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Note. Loss feedback elicited slightly larger and more prolonged P3components. 
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Figure 3.9 
Scatter plots for the difference in the MFN amplitude at Fz between the large and small 
cues and levels of cognitive distortions. 
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Figure 3.10 
Scatter plots for the difference in MFN amplitude at Fz between large and small cues and 
conscientiousness scores. 
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Figure 3.11 
Scatter plots for the difference in P300 amplitude at CPz between large and small cues 
and neuroticism scores. 
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Figure 3.12 
Scatter plots for the difference in the MFN amplitude at Fz between win and loss cues 
and levels of obsessive compulsive characteristics reported. 
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Figure 3.13 
Scatter plots for the difference in the P3 amplitude at CPz between large and small cues 
and sensitivity to reward scores. 
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Figure 3.14 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the small win cues and harm avoidance 
scores. 
50.00 
45.00 
0) o 40 .00 
tJ 
(1) 
0) 
L~ 
C 
.g; 35.00-
o 
>: 
<l 
E 
'-
:I!. 30.00-
25.00-
20.00-
-8.00 
o 
o 
Q 
o 
o 
o 
o 
-13.00 -4.00 
o 0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
-2.00 
o o 
R Sq Linear = 0.235 
0.00 
FR~'J Amplitude at Fz for-the Small ",I'/in Cues 
176 
Figure 3.15 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the small loss cues and harm avoidance 
scores. 
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Figure 3.16 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the large win cues and harm avoidance 
scores. 
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Figure 3.17 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the small loss cues and sensation 
seeking scores. 
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Figure 3.18 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the large win cues and sensation 
seeking scores. 
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Figure 3.19 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the large win cues and levels of 
reported cognitive distortions 
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Figure 3.20 
Scatter plots for the P3 amplitude at CPz during the small loss cues and harm avoidance 
scores 
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Figure 3.21 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at CPz during the small loss cues and sensation 
seeking scores. 
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Figure 3.22 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the zero cues and levels of cognitive 
distortions. 
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Figure 3.23 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the zero cues and harm avoidance 
scores. 
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Figure 3.24 
Scatter plots for the MFN amplitude at Fz during the zero cues and perfectionism scores. 
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Figure 3.25 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at CPz during the zero cues and scores on the BIS 
scale. 
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Figure 3.26 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at CPz during the zero cues and scores on the delay 
discounting task. 
0:10 
..2:!:: 0 .08 
eJ) 
ro 
I-
0) 
c 
~  
C 
::J 
0 0.06-L) 
~0 
0 
>. 
ro 
(D 
0 
tV 0.04 
£:. 
...... 
C 
0 
tV 
'-
0 o 
c~ 
(1) 002-
0 .00-
-2.00 0.00 
o 
o 
o 
o o 
o o 
2.00 
c) 
o 
4.00 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
13.00 
P300 Ampl itude at CPz for the Zem Cues 
188 
o 
R Sq Linear = 0.172 
8.00 1000 
Figure 3.27 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz during the win feedback and harm avoidance 
scores. 
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Figure 3.28 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz during the loss feedback and harm avoidance 
scores. 
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Figure 3.29 
Scatter plots for the FRN amplitude at Cz during the loss feedback and sensation seeking 
scores. 
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Figure 3.30 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz during the win feedback and harm avoidance 
scores. 
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Figure 3.31 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz during the loss feedback and harm avoidance 
scores. 
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Figure 3.32 
Scatter plots for the P300 amplitude at Cz during the loss feedback and sensitivity to 
reward scores. 
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Appendix A 
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Subject ID _______ _ Date: 
- -------
1. How old are you? _________ _ What is your major? __________ _ 
2. Sex: M F What are your goals after the completion of your current degree? ----------
3. Have you ever been diagnosed/experienced any neurological conditions (e.g. epilepsy, stroke, concussion etc)? 
4. Do you smoke cigarettes? Y N 
If yes, approximately how many a day? _______________ _ 
5. Have you experienced any recent stressor (e.g. death in the family, birth of a child, e:..:.tc=...)~? _______________ _ 
6. For each of these activities, please decide which hand you normally use but checking the box. In each case, imagine that you are actually 
carrying out the activity before answering. 
1. Which hand do you use to write? 
2. Which hand is used to throw a ball? 
3. Which hand is used to draw? 
4. Which hand is used to cut with a knife? 
5. Which hand is used to hold a tennis racquet? 
6. Hammer in a nail, which hand wields the hammer? 
7. Which hand uses scissors? 
8. Which hand strikes a match? 
9. Thread a needle, which hand moves? 
10. Which hand deals the cards? 
1 
Always 
Left 
D 
D 
D 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
2 3 
Usually Either 
Left Hand 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D 0 
0 D 
0 0 
D D 
D D 
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4 5 6 
Usually Always Not Sure 
Right Right 
D D D 
D D D 
D D D 
D 0 D 
D 0 D 
D 0 D 
D D D 
D 0 D 
D D D 
D D D 
BIS/BAS Scales 
Listed below are items concerning behaviours exhibited by adults. Read each item 
carefully and decide how accurately the behaviour describes you. Indicate your response 
for each item by circling the number that corresponds to your response choice. 
0= VERY ACCURATE 
1= ACCURATE 
2= NEITHER ACCURATE NOR INACCURATE 
3= INACCURATE 
4= VERY INACCURATE 
1. If! think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up". 
o 1 234 
2. I worry about making mistakes. 
o 123 4 
3. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. 
o 1 234 
4. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. 
o 1 234 
5. Even if something bad is about t6 happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness. 
o 1 234 
6. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something. 
o 1 234 
7. I have very few fears compared to my friends. 
o 1 234 
8. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized. 
o 1 234 
9. When I am doing we11 at something, I love to keep at it. 
o 1 234 
10. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. 
o 1 234 
11. It would excite me to win a contest. 
o 1 234 
12. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get excited right away. 
o 1 234 
13. When I want something, I usua11y go a11-out to get it. 
o 123 4 
14.1 go out of my way to get things I want. 
o 1 234 
15. If! see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away. 
o 1 234 
16. When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach. 
o 123 4 
17.1 will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
o 1 234 
18. I crave excitement and new sensations 
o 1 234 
19. I am always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun. 
o 1 234 
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20. I often act on spur of the moment. 
o 1 234 
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Neuroticism 
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the 
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as 
you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see 
yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same 
age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in 
absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then circle the number on the scale 
that relates to you. 
Response Options 
l=Very Inaccurate 
2=Moderately Inaccurate 
3=Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate 
4=Moderately Accurate 
5=Very Accurate 
1. I often feel blue. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I rarely lose my composure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I dislike myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I remain calm under pressure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I am often down in the dumps. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I have frequent mood swings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am not easily frustrated. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I panic easily. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I seldom get mad. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I am filled with doubts about things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I feel threatened easily. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I am relaxed most ofthe time. 
1 2 345 
13. I get stressed out easily. 
12345 
14. I am very pleased with myself. 
12345 
15. I fear for the worst. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I am not easily bothered by things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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17. I worry about things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I rarely get irritated. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I seldom feel blue. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. I feel comfortable with myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
200 
Perfectionism 
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the 
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe 
yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself 
as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you 
are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, 
your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, 
and then circle the number on the scale that relates to you. 
Response Options 
1 = Very Inaccurate 
2 = Moderately Inaccurate 
3 = Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate 
4 = Moderately Accurate 
5 = Very Accurate 
1. I continue until everything is perfect. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I am not bothered by messy people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I want every detail taken care of. 
12345 
4. I am not bothered by disorder. 
12345 
5. I want everything to be "just right" 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I want things to proceed according to plan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I demand perfection in others. 
12345 
8. I keep a sharp eye on others' work. 
12345 
9. I expect dedicated work from others. 
12345 
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Conscientiousness 
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating 
scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you 
generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future . Describe yourself as you honestly see 
yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same 
age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in 
absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then circle the number on the scale 
that relates to you. 
Response Options 
1 = Very Inaccurate 
2 = Moderately Inaccurate 
3 = N either Inaccurate nor Accurate 
4 = Moderately Accurate 
5 = Very Accurate 
1. I am always prepared. 
1 2 345 
2. I need a push to get started. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I pay attention to details. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I make a mess of things 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I get chores done right away. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I don't put my mind on the task at hand 
1 2 345 
7. I carry out my plans. 
1 2 3 4 
8. I leave things unfinished. 
1 2 3 4 
9. I make plans and stick to them. 
1 2 3 4 
10. I mess things up. 
1 2 3 4 
11. I complete tasks successfully. 
1 2 3 
12. I shirk my duties. 
123 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
13. I do things according to a plan. 
12345 
14. I don't see things through. 
1 2 345 
15. I am exacting in my work. 
12345 
16. I do just enough work to get by. 
12345 
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17. I finish what I start. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I find it difficult to get down to work 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I follow through with my plans. 
1 2 345 
20. I waste my time. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Obsessive Compulsive Characteristics 
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their 
everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has 
DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST MONTH. The numbers refer to 
the following verbal labels: 
o 1 234 
Not at all A little Moderately A lot Extremely 
1. I have saved up so many things that they get in the way. 
o 1 234 
2. I check things more often than necessary. 
o 123 4 
3. I get upset if objects are not arranged properly. 
o 1 234 
4. I feel compelled to count while I am doing things. 
o 123 4 
5. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers 
or certain people. 
o 1 234 
6. I find it difficult to control my own thoughts. 
o 123 4 
7. I collect things I don't need. 
o 1 234 
8. I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers etc. 
o 123 4 
9. I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things. 
o 1 234 
10. I feel I have to repeat certain numbers. 
o 123 4 
11. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated. 
o 1 234 
12. I am upset by unpleasant thoughts and come into my mind against my will. 
o 1 234 
13. I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need them later even 
though I know I won't. 
o 1 234 
14. I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off. 
o 1 234 
15. I need things to be arranged in a particular order. 
o 123 4 
16. I feel that there are good and bad numbers. 
o 1 234 
17. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary. 
o 123 4 
18. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them. 
o 1 234 
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Sensitivity to Punishment/Sensitivity to Reward 
Read the statement carefully and decide which of the 4 responses choices below 
most accurately describes your answer to the question. Circle the appropriate answer. 
Each statement can be answered with ONE of the following 4 responses: 
YY = very much Yes, Y=Yes, N=No 
-, NN = very much No 
1. Do you often refrain from doing something because you are afraid of it being 
illegal? 
YYYNNN 
2. Does the good prospect of obtaining money motivate you strongly to do things? 
YYYNNN 
3. Do you prefer not to ask for something when you are not sure you will get it? 
YYYNNN 
4. Are you frequently encouraged to act by the possibility of being valued in your 
work? 
YYYNNN 
5. Are you often afraid of new or unexpected situations? 
YYYNNN 
6. Do you often meet people that you find physically attractive? 
YYYNNN 
7. Is it difficult for you to telephone someone you do not know? 
YYYNNN 
8. Do you like to take some drugs because of the pleasure you get from them? 
YYYNNN 
9. Do you often give up your rights when you know you can avoid a quarrel with a 
person? 
YYYNNN 
10. Do you often do things to be praised? 
YYYNNN 
11. As a child, were you troubled by punishments at home or in school? 
YYYNNN 
12. Do you like being the center of attention at a party or social meeting? 
YYYNNN 
205 
13. In tasks that you are not prepared for, do you attach great importance to the 
possibility of failure? 
YYYNNN 
14. Do you spend a lot of your time on obtaining a good image? 
YY Y N NN 
15. Are you easily discouraged in difficult situations? 
YYYNNN 
16. Do you need people to show their affection for you all the time? 
YYYNNN 
17. Are you a shy person? 
YYYNNN 
18. When you are in a group, do you try to make your opinions the most intelligent or 
funniest? 
YYYNNN 
19. Whenever possible, do you avoid demonstrating your skills for fear of being 
embarrassed? 
YYYNNN 
20. Do you often take the opportunity to pick up people you find attractive? 
YYYNNN 
21. When you are with a group, do you have difficulties selecting a good topic to talk 
about? 
YYYNNN 
22. As a child, did you do a lot of things to get peoples' approval? 
YYYNNN 
23. Is it often difficult for you to fall asleep when you think about things you have 
done or must do? 
YYYNNN 
24. Does the possibility of social advancement ("moving up the social ladder") make 
you do things, even if it involves not playing fair? 
YYYNNN 
25. Do you think a lot before complaining in a restaurant if your meal is not well 
prepared? 
YYYNNN 
26. Do you prefer activities that have an immediate gain? 
YYYNNN 
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27. Would you be bothered if you had to return to a store if you were given the wrong 
change? 
YYYNNN 
28. Do you often have trouble resisting the temptation of doing forbidden things? 
YYYNNN 
29. Whenever you can, do you avoid going to unknown places? 
YYYNNN 
30. Do you like to compete and do everything you can to win? 
YYYNNN 
31. Are you often worried by things that you said or did? 
YYYNNN 
32. Is it easy for you to associate tastes and smells to very pleasant events? 
YYYNNN 
33. Would it be difficult for you to ask your boss for a raise (salary increase)? 
YY Y N NN 
34. Are there a large number of objects or sensations that remind you of pleasant 
things? 
YYYNNN 
35. Do you generally try to avoid speaking in public? 
YYYNNN 
36. When you start to play with a slot machine, is it often difficult for you to stop? 
YYYNNN 
37. Do you, on a regular basis, think that you could do more things ifit was not for 
you insecurity or fear? 
YYYNNN 
38. Do you do things for quick gains? 
YYYNNN 
39. Comparing yourself to people you know, are you afraid of many things? 
YYYNNN 
40. Does you attention easily stray from work in the presence of an attractive 
stranger? 
YYYNNN 
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41. Do you often find yourself worrying about things so much that it disrupts your 
thinking? 
YYYNNN 
42. Are you interested in money to the point of being able to do risky jobs? 
YYYNNN 
43. Do you avoid doing things you like in order not to be rejected or disapproved? 
YYYNNN 
44. Do you make most activities competitive? 
YYYNNN 
45. Generally, do you pay more attention to threats than to pleasant events? 
YYYNNN 
46. Would you like to be a socially powerful person? 
YY Y N NN 
47. Do you often refrain from doing something because of your fear of being 
embarrassed? 
YYYNNN 
48. Do you like displaying your physical abilities even though this may involve 
danger? 
YYYNNN 
208 
Harm Avoidance 
Directions: On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. 
Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes 
you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. 
Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of 
the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in 
an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read each 
statement carefully, and then circle the number on the scale that relates to you. 
Response Options 
1 = Very Inaccurate 
2 = Moderately Inaccurate 
3 = Neither Inaccurate nor 
Accurate 
4 = Moderately Accurate 
5 = Very Accurate 
1. I would never go hang gliding or bungee jumping. 
12345 
2. I take risks 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I seek danger. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am willing to try anything once. 
12345 
5. I would never make a high risk investment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I enjoy being reckless. 
123 
7. I do dangerous things. 
123 
8. I know no limits. 
123 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
9. I avoid dangerous situations. 
12345 
10. I let myself go. 
123 4 5 
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Sensation Seeking (SS-F III) 
Each statement can be answered True or False. Read the statement and decide which of 
the 4 responses choices below most accurately describes you. Circle the appropriate 
answer. 
TT = very much true, T=true, F=false, FF=very much false 
1. I often wish I could be a mountain climber. 
TT T F FF 
2. I like some of the earthy body smells. 
TT T F FF 
3. I can't stand watching a movie that I've seen before. 
TT T F FF 
4. I like wild "uninhibited" parties. 
TT T F FF 
5. I like to explore a strange city or section of town myself, even if it means getting 
lost. 
TT T F FF 
6. I get bored seeing the same old faces . 
TT T F FF 
7. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening. 
TT T F FF 
8. People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are sometimes strange. 
TT T F FF 
9. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned or definite routes or 
timetables. 
TT T F FF 
10. I get very restless if! have to stay around home for any length of times. 
TT T F FF 
11. I have no patience with dull or boring persons. 
TT T F FF 
12. I would like to learn to fly an airplane. 
TT T F FF 
13. I would like to meet some persons who are homosexual (men or women). 
TT T F FF 
14. When you can predict almost everything a person will do and say, he or she must 
be a bore. 
TT T F FF 
15. I often like to get high (drinking liquor or smoking marijuana). 
TT T F FF 
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16. I would like to go scuba diving. 
TT T F FF 
17. I have tried marijuana or would like to. 
TT T F FF 
18. I usually don't enjoy a movie or play where I can predict what will happen in 
advance. 
TT T F FF 
19. I could conceive of myself seeking pleasures around the world with the 'jet set". 
TT T F FF 
20. I would like to try some of the new drugs that produce hallucination. 
TT T F FF 
21. I would like to take up the sport of water skiing. 
TT T F FF 
22. I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before. 
TT T F FF 
23. I enjoy watching many of the "sexy" scenes in movies. 
TT T F FF 
24. The worst social sin is to be a bore. 
TT T F FF 
25. I often find beauty in the "clashing" of colours and irregular form of modem 
painting. 
TT T F FF 
26. I think I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very fast down a high mountain 
slope. 
TT T F FF 
27. I would like to try parachute jumping. 
TT T F FF 
28. Looking at someone's home movies or travel slides bores me tremendously. 
TT T F FF 
29. Keeping the drinks full is the key to a good party. 
TT T F FF 
30. I would like to sail a long distance in a small but seaworthy sailing craft. 
TT T F FF 
31. I would like to make friends in some of the "far-out" groups like artists or 
"hippies" . 
TT T F FF 
32. I feel best after taking a couple of drinks. 
TT T F FF 
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33. I would like to try surfboard riding. 
TT T F FF 
34. I enjoy the company of real "swingers". 
TT T F FF 
35. I like people who are sharp and witty even if they do sometimes insult others. 
TT T F FF 
36. I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations even it they are a little 
unconventional or illegaL 
TT T F FF 
37. I like to dive off the high board. 
TT T F FF 
38. A person should have considerable sexual experience before marriage. 
TT T F FF 
39. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable. 
TT T F FF 
40. I like to date people who are physically exciting. 
TT T F FF 
212 
Delay Discounting 
Please take these choices seriously, as if they were real money choices. 
Please circle the amount you would prefer in each case: 
1. $54 today OR $55 in 117 days? 
2. $55 today OR $75 in 61 days? 
3. $19 today OR $25 in 53 days? 
4. $31 today OR $85 in 7 days? 
5. $14 today OR $25 in 19 days? 
6. $47 today OR $50 in 160 days? 
7. $15 today OR $35 in 13 days? 
8. $25 today OR $60 in 14 days? 
9. $78 today OR $80 in 162 days? 
10. $40 today OR $55 in 62 days? 
11. $11 today OR $30 in 7 days? 
12. $67 today OR $75 in 119 days? 
13. $34 today OR $35 in 186 days? 
14. $27 today OR $50 in 21 days? 
15. $69 today OR $85 in 91 days? 
16. $49 today OR $60 in 89 days? 
17. $80 today OR $85 in 157 days? 
18. $24 today OR $35 in 29 days? 
19. $33 today OR $80 in 14 days? 
20. $28 today OR $30 in 179 days? 
21. $34 today OR $50 in 30 days? 
22. $25 today OR $30 in 80 days? 
23.$41 today OR $75 in 20 days? 
24. $54 today OR $60 in 111 days? 
25. $54 today OR $80 in 30 days? 
26. $22 today OR $25 in 136 days? 
27.20 today OR $55 in 7 days? 
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Cognitive Distortions (Gambler's Beliefs Questionnaire) 
Read each ofthe following statements carefully. Rate to what extent you agree or 
disagree with each statement by circling a number. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
agree 
1. I think of gambling as a challenge. 
1 2 3 
Neutral 
4 5 6 
Strongly 
Disagree 
7 
2. My knowledge and skill in gambling contribute to the likelihood that I will make 
money. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My choices or actions affect the game on which I am betting. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. If! am gambling and losing, I should continue because I don't want to miss a win. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I should keep track of previous winning bets so that I can figure out how I should bet 
in the future. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. When I am gambling, "near misses" or times when I almost win remind me that if I 
keep playing I will win. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Gambling is more than just luck. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. My gambling wins are evidence that I have skill and knowledge related to gambling. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I have a "lucky" technique that I use when I gamble. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. In the long run, I will win more money than I will lose gambling. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Even though I may be losing with my gambling strategy or plan, I must maintain that 
strategy or plan because I know it will eventually come through for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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12. There are certain things I do when I am betting (for example, tapping a certain 
number of times, holding a lucky coin in my hand, crossing my fingers, etc.) which 
increase the chances that I will win. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. IfI lose money gambling, I should try to win it back. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Those who don't gamble much don't understand that gambling success requires 
dedication and a willingness to invest some money. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Where I get money to gamble doesn't matter because I will win and pay it back. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I am pretty accurate at predicting when a "win" will occur. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Gambling is the best way for me to experience excitement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. IfI continue to gamble, it will eventually pay off and I will make money. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. I have more skills and knowledge related to gambling than most people who gamble. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. When I lose at gambling, my losses are not as bad if I don't tell my loved ones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. I should keep the same bet even when it hasn't come up lately because it is bound to 
Will. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Date: 
Project Title: Brainwave Responses to Winning Money 
Principal Investigator: 
Angela Dzyundzyak, MA Candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
905-688-5550 x3034, ad03cr@brocku.ca 
INVITATION 
Faculty Supervisor: 
S.J. Segalowitz, Professor 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3465, ssegalowitz@brocku.ca 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to 
measure brain activity while performing a gambling task as well as examine personal style and an 
individual's experiences relate to the brain patterns. 
WHAT'S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to answer some questionnaires assessing activity preferences 
and experience in participating in gambling behaviours. Then a brainwave sensor net will be 
placed on your scalp. You will be asked to complete some tasks on the computer. The first task 
will require you to respond within the allotted time in order to win or avoid losing a certain 
monetary reward. During the second task you will be asked to choose between two cards showing 
the amount of possible win/loss. Once the decision is made you will be given feedback if it was a 
win or a loss and what the alternate outcome would have been. Tasks will be divided into 9 and 5 
blocks respectively, 5 minutes per each block. After each block the running total will be recorded 
and at the end of the experiment a block number for each task will be drawn at random. The 
amount accumulated during that trial will be given as a monetary reward. Once the computer 
tasks are finished, the sensors will be removed. Participation will take approximately 3 hours of 
your time. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include the chance to see your brain activity on a computer 
screen, and ask questions of the researchers about EEG procedures and brain health. There are no 
known or anticipated risks associated with participation in this study. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in any 
other way, associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because our interest is in 
the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in 
any way in written reports of this research. 
Data collected during this study will be kept for 5 years after final publication of results and 
stored in a limited access area ofthe Brock Neuropsychology laboratory. Only researchers 
associated with the Brock Neuropsychology laboratory will have access to the data. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or 
participate in any component ofthe study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at 
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any time and may do so without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. 
Participation hours will be awarded at a rate of 0.5 research hour per half an hour to the nearest 
half hour. Monetary compensation will be based on the amount of money won at the point of 
withdrawal; the amount given will depend on the rules of the task completed prior to withdrawal. 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. 
Feedback about this study will be available through Angela Dzyundzyak (ad03cr(a;brocku.ca). As 
EEG data takes a long time to analyze, we do not anticipate full results of the study to be ready 
until April 2009. 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact the 
Principal Investigator or the Faculty Supervisor using the contact information provided above. 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at 
Brock University (REB #07-217). If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a 
research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, 
reb@brocku.ca. 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in the study described above. I have made this decision based on the 
information I have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive 
any additional details I wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the 
future. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time. 
I am participating in this experiment for __ hours of research participation in a psychology 
course as well as monetary reward ($20 to $40 on average). 
Signature of participant 
Signature of experimenter 
OR 
Course for participation 
I am participating in this experiment for a monetary reward only. This experiment will not count 
toward research participation hours in a psychology course. 
Signature of participant Signature of experimenter 
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Questions following the pure gambling task (Study 1) 
Instructions: Indicate how happy/disappointed you felt in the following 
scenanos. 
1. Please indicate how HAPPY you were when you WON a SMALL 
amount (~$0.50)? 
2. Please indicate how HAPPY you were when you WON a LARGE 
amount (~$2.00)? 
3. Please indicate how DISAPPOINTED you were when you LOST a 
SMALL amount (~$0.50)? 
4. Please indicate how DISAPPOINTED you were when you LOST a 
LARGE amount (~$2.00)? 
Instructions: Assuming the card you CHOSE was a WIN please answer the 
following questions. 
5. (Chose Win) Please indicate how HAPPY you were when the 
alternative was a SMALLER win? 
6. (Chose Win) Please indicate how DISAPPOINTED you were when the 
alternative was a LARGER win? 
7. (Chose Win) Please indicate how HAPPY you were when the 
alternative was a LOSS? 
Instructions: Assuming the card you CHOSE was a LOSS please answer the 
following questions. 
8. (Chose Loss) Please indicate how HAPPY you were when the 
alternative was a LARGER loss? 
9. Chose Loss) Please indicate how DISAPPOINTED you were when the 
alternative was a SMALLER loss? 
10. (Chose Loss) Please indicate how DISAPPOINTED you were when the 
alternative was a WIN? 
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Feedback Form - Neuropsychology Lab -- Brock University 
Title of Study: Brainwave Responses to Winning Money 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for taking part in this study. Without the help of volunteers these types of 
studies could not be done. 
As you are aware, this research study was conducted by Angela Dzyundzyak, in 
the Psychology Department of Brock University. The purpose of the study was to pilot 
the tasks involving winning and losing money and identify any event related potentials 
(ERPs) that are associated with various stages of processing of reward-related 
information (e.g. large or small) as well as feedback information (win vs. loss). 
The first task that you have completed was adapted from paper by Bjork and 
colleagues (2004). Originally this task was used to investigate activations of various brain 
areas using fMRI. We are hoping to employ the modified task in order to define ERPs 
specifically related to differentiation between the value of the reward and positive vs. 
negative feedback. Additionally, employing similar task will not only allow us to 
compare the obtained results with previous research but aid in localization of the obtained 
ERPs based on the fMRI data. The second task was also adapted from a previous study 
done in 2004 by Yeung and Sanfey. These authors showed that value (small vs. large) 
and valence (win vs. loss) of the reward are processed separately in the brain. In this 
study, we will try to replicate their findings with a slightly modified task. Developing 
relatively short and straightforward tasks that allow us to separate responses and 
processes that comprise risk-taking behaviour is necessary in order to move the field 
forward and will later allow researchers to employ these tasks to examine other 
populations (e.g. adolescents at risk for gambling problems). 
The win and loss rate for both tasks were artificially manipulated for research 
purposes and thus do not indicate success at gambling. The first task sped up in case of 
win and slowed down after losses. The second paradigm had a success rate of 60% and 
40% loss. 
In addition to piloting the tasks, this study examined the role individual 
differences play in the risk-taking behaviour. The questionnaires that you have completed 
were designed to measure levels of various individual differences in personality traits 
such as sensation-seeking, harm-avoidance and impulsivity. These data will later be used 
to examine the extent to which individual differences contribute/related to risk-taking 
behaviour. As you are aware all the data will be kept strictly confidential and thus during 
the scoring of the questionnaires you will not be identified in any way. 
If you would like to learn more about the results of this study you could call 
Angela Dzyundzyak at the 905-688-5550, Ext. 3034, or email her at ad03cr(a)'brocku.ca. 
It takes a lot of time to do the analyses though so the results are not likely to be ready 
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before September 2009; however, if you are interested in the results feel free to leave 
your email and we will let you know when the results are available. 
If you have any concerns or would like to find out more about gambling-related 
issues the Niagara Alcohol and Drug Assessment Services (NADAS) website is a good 
resource (http://www.nadas.on.ca/). Additionally, NADAS (24-hour on call service: 905-
684-1859) as well as the Student Development Center at Brock University (ext. 3240 or 
5484) offer counselling services for individuals with gambling problems. 
Thank you again for taking part. Your help was very much appreciated. 
If you have any issues you would like to discuss regarding your involvement in the study, 
you could call the Brock Research Ethics Board through the Research Office at 905-688-
5550, Ext. 3035. 
Angela Dzyundzyak 
MA Candidate 
905-688-5550 x3034 
ad03cr@brocku.ca 
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Sid Segalowitz 
Supervising Professor 
905-688-5550 x 3465 
sid.segalowitz@brocku.ca 
Copy of Research Ethics Board Acceptance Letter 
FROM: Michelle McGinn, Chair Research Ethics Board (REB) 
TO: Dr. Segalowitz, Psychology; Angela Dzyundzyak 
FILE: 07-217 SEGALOWITZ/DZYUNDZYA 
TITLE: Brainwave responses to winning money 
February 25, 2008 
The Brock University Research Ethics Board has reviewed the above research proposal. 
DECISION: Accepted as Clarified 
Please Note: The average amount and/or range of monetary compensation should be 
stated on the consent form. 
This project has received ethics clearance for the period of February 25, 2008 to 
October 1,2009 subject to full REB ratification at the Research Ethics Board's next 
scheduled meeting. The clearance period may be extended upon request. The study may 
now proceed. 
Please note that the Research Ethics Board (REB) requires that you adhere to the 
protocol as last reviewed and cleared by the REB. During the course of research no 
deviations from, or changes to, the protocol, recruitment, or consent form may be 
initiated without prior written clearance from the REB. The Board must provide clearance 
for any modifications before they can be implemented. If you wish to modify your 
research project, please refer to http://www.brocku.ca/researchservices/fom1s to complete 
the appropriate form Revision or Modification to an Ongoing Application. 
Adverse or unexpected events must be reported to the REB as soon as possible with an 
indication of how these events affect, in the view of the Principal Investigator, the safety 
of the participants and the continuation of the protocol. 
If research participants are in the care of a health facility, at a school, or other 
institution or community organization, it is the responsibility of the Principal Investigator 
to ensure that the ethical guidelines and clearance of those facilities or institutions are 
obtained and filed with the REB prior to the initiation of any research protocols. 
The Tri-Council Policy Statement requires that ongoing research be monitored. A Final 
Report is required for all projects upon completion of the project. Researchers with 
projects lasting more than one year are required to submit a Continuing Review Report 
annually. The Office of Research Services will contact you when this form Continuing 
Review/Final Report is required. 
Kate Williams 
Research Ethics Assistant 
Office of Research Ethics, MC D250A 
Brock University 
Office of Research Services 
500 Glenridge Avenue 
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L2S 3Al 
phone: (905)688-5550, ext. 3035; fax: (905)688-0748; email: reb@brocku.ca 
http://www.brocku.ca!rt;;;~i!r~h~GEices/9thics{hl1manethies! 
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